Lawrence M. Ausubel
Management Science and Operations Research · 2002–2014
A researcher in the Science corpus: 9 papers; trusts 9 researchers and is trusted by 40 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.
Subfields
- Management Science and Operations Research — 31 citations into it; #622 of 11,946 by trust here, #892 by citations
- Marketing — 24 citations into it; #172 of 6,289 by trust here, #465 by citations
- Economics and Econometrics — 18 citations into it; #1,730 of 23,481 by trust here, #4,166 by citations
- Management Information Systems — 7 citations into it; #1,445 of 3,376 by trust here, #1,705 by citations
Whom Lawrence M. Ausubel trusts overall
Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.
- Faruk Gul
- Paul R. Milgrom
- Motty Perry
- V. Krishna
- D. Parkes
- Peter Cramton
- Sushil Bikhchandani
- Philip J. Reny
- Roger B. Myerson
- F. Schlenk
Who trusts Lawrence M. Ausubel overall
- Peter Cramton
- Kazuo Murota
- Glenn W. Harrison
- Paul R. Milgrom
- Akiyoshi Shioura
- Thomas Schlechte
- Sven de Vries
- Robert W. Day
- Jawad Abrache
- John William Hatfield
Papers from Lawrence M. Ausubel's perspective
Ordered by how strongly the researchers Lawrence M. Ausubel trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.
- Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
- Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design
- A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions (Management Sciences)
- Intertemporal Price Discrimination
- Dynamic Choices of Hyperbolic Consumers
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding II
- Is Addiction “Rational”? Theory and Evidence
- Optimal Auction Design
- The Package Assignment Model (Journal of Economics Theory)
- Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem
Their papers
- Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (2002) — 745 citations
- An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects (2004) — 802 citations
- The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (2004) — 681 citations
- Auctioning Many Divisible Goods (2004) — 167 citations
- Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions (2014) — 392 citations
- An efficient dynamic auction for heterogeneous commodities (2006) — 329 citations
- The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design (2004) — 321 citations
- Time Inconsistency in the Credit Card Market (2004) — 218 citations
- Bargaining with Incomplete Information (2002) — 338 citations