V. Krishna
Management Science and Operations Research · with Benoît · 1985–2008
A researcher in the Science corpus: 5 papers; trusts 3 researchers and is trusted by 11 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.
Subfields
- Management Science and Operations Research — 8 citations into it; #4,264 of 11,946 by trust here, #6,314 by citations
- Economics and Econometrics — 5 citations into it; #9,015 of 23,481 by trust here, #16,755 by citations
Whom V. Krishna trusts overall
Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.
Who trusts V. Krishna overall
- Sandro Brusco
- Jonathan Bendor
- Wouter Dessein
- John Morgan
- Marco Battaglini
- Kim-Sau Chung
- Giuseppe Lopomo
- Lawrence M. Ausubel
- Adam Meirowitz
- Georgios Papoudakis
Papers from V. Krishna's perspective
Ordered by how strongly the researchers V. Krishna trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.
- STRATEGIC INFORMATION TRANSMISSION
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments (American Political Science Review)
- Authority and Communication in Organizations
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts
- Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation
- A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control. (The American Economic Review)
- Consumption--Savings Decisions with Quasi--Geometric Discounting
- Self-Control for the Righteous: Toward a Theory of Precommitment to Indulgence
Their papers
- Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments (2001) — 237 citations
- Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design (2001) — 153 citations
- Contracting for Information Under Imperfect Commitment (2004) — 155 citations
- Asymmetric Auctions with Resale (2008) — 155 citations
- Finitely Repeated Games (1985)