A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding II

By R. Weber, Paul R. Milgrom. 2000

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On the Asymptotic Distribution of the Transaction Price in a Clock Model of a Multi-Unit, Oral, Ascending-Price Auction within the Common-Value Paradigm (2013, methodology): “According to Milgrom and Weber [17], the symmetric equil ibr um bidding rule in roundm can be written as βm(x) = E [V|X1 = Yk = · · · = Ym−1 = x,Ωm] .”
An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects (2004, background): “There are five identical licenses for auction.6 Bidders have taste for more than one license, but each is limited to winning at most three licenses.7 There are five bidders with values in the relevant range, and their marginal values are given as in Table 1 (where numbers are expressed in millions…”