Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions

By Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Marek Pycia, Marzena Rostek, Marek Weretka. 2014

392 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/75a491f6ffdf9dd442d1bd421eed4e650b15f720

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Axel Ockenfels
2. Peter Cramton
3. M. Peek
4. Felix Müsgens
5. Alvin E. Roth

In Marketing

1. Axel Ockenfels
2. Peter Cramton
3. M. Peek
4. Felix Müsgens
5. Alvin E. Roth

Citations in the corpus

• Economics and design of balancing power markets in Germany (2014, background): “Theory does not find a unique ranking with respect to efficiency or procurement costs regarding the settlement rules [1].”
• Electricity market design (2017, background): “In a clearingprice auction, sellers have an incentive to offer above marginal cost and buyers have an incentive to bid below marginal value (Ausubel et al., 2014).”