An efficient dynamic auction for heterogeneous commodities

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Discrete convex analysis: A tool for economics and game theory (2016, methodology): “Based on the Lyapunov function approach of Ausubel (2006) and Sun & Yang (2009), Murota et al.”
GROSS SUBSTITUTES CONDITION AND DISCRETE CONCAVITY FOR MULTI-UNIT VALUATIONS: A SURVEY (2015, methodology): “The algorithm works if we can obtain the information of buyers’ demand correspondences D(fb, p), even if we do not know the function values of fb (see Ausubel [1]).”
The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design (2004, neutral): “First, bidders directly submit bids in a clock auction, until there is no excess demand for any item.”
The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices (2006, neutral): “Deterministic protocols achieving this were proposed in [3,9,14,34].”
Combinatorial auctions (2007, positive): “Ausubel (2006) suggests an iterative implementation of the VCG with GS preferences. Ausubel’s mechanism requires however to run |J | + 1 parallel auctions in order to compute the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves payments. The Extend & Adjust iterative mechanism (Parkes 2001; Parkes and Ungar 2002) computes the”