A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions

By A. Kwasnica, John O. Ledyard, D. Porter, C. DeMartini. Management Sciences, 2005

294 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Combinatorial auctions (2007, unknown): “Although the RAD mechanism achieves high level of ex post efficiency in experiments (Kwasnica et al. 2005), theoretical efficiency results are not available.”
Behavior in operations management: Assessing recent findings and revisiting old assumptions (2006, methodology): “Finally, Kwasnica et al. (2005) introduce and test the performance of a new auction design coined the Resource Allocation Design (RAD) auction, which combines the best aspects of simultaneous multi-round and adoptive user selection mechanisms.”
Combinatorial Auctions for Transportation Service Procurement: The Carrier Perspective (2003, background): “DeMartini et al ( 11 ) presented a new design for combinatorial auctions and discussed this problem.”
The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design (2004, methodology): “Several recent proposed combinatorial auction procedures, such as the RAD procedure studied in Kwasnica et al. (2005), produce approximate shadow prices on individual items to help guide bidders.”
Consensus-Based Decentralized Auctions for Robust Task Allocation (2009, background): “The traditional way of computing the winner is to have a central system acting as the auctioneer to receive and evaluate each bid in the fleet [31]–[33].”