Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding

By Lawrence M. Ausubel, Paul R. Milgrom. 2002

745 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/caf9c83ea63a5871e0cb0c7f220dcd6fa44a7877

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Kazuo Murota
2. Peter Cramton
3. Paul R. Milgrom
4. Thomas Schlechte
5. Robert W. Day
6. John William Hatfield
7. Paul Klemperer
8. Akihisa Tamura

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Peter Cramton
2. Kazuo Murota
3. Paul R. Milgrom
4. Robert W. Day
5. Thomas Schlechte
6. Paul Klemperer
7. John William Hatfield
8. Ilya Segal

In Marketing

1. Peter Cramton
2. Kazuo Murota
3. Paul R. Milgrom
4. Robert W. Day
5. Thomas Schlechte
6. Paul Klemperer
7. John William Hatfield
8. Ilya Segal

Citations in the corpus

• Algorithmic Game Theory (2012, neutral): “[AM02] also discussed connections to coalitional games and their core.”
• Core-selecting package auctions (2008, background): “In these cases, the mechanism that selects the doctor-optimal match is ex post incentivecompatible for doctors and a mechanism, the ascending proxy auction of Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), which selects a bidder-optimal allocation (a core allocation that is Pareto optimal for bidders), is ex post ince”
• Auctions and Information acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats? (2007, background): “Consider the event where n1 = n− 1, and θ((2)) < v −∆ and v +∆ < θ((1)).”
• The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design (2004, neutral): “Theorem (Ausubel and Milgrom 2002, Parkes and Ungar 2000).”
• Simultaneous Ascending Auctions (2004, background): “The inefficiencies of demand reduction can be eliminated with a Vickrey auction or more practically with an ascending proxy auction or a clock-proxy auction (see Ausubel and Milgrom 2002 and Chapters 1, 3 and 5).”
• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices (2006, background): “For example, in many proposed iterative auction designs, at each stage bidders only need to describe their preferences over a small number of bundles [4,9,17,26,36,38].”
• Combinatorial auction design (2003, background): “14 Discussion of VCG mechanisms in combinatorial auctions are in Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), Bikhchandani et al.”
• A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions (2005, background): “Parkes (1999) and Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) are recent examples that allow this more expressive bidding language.”
• Understanding Preferences: “Demand Types”, and the Existence of Equilibrium With Indivisibilities (2019, background): “, Ausubel and Milgrom, 2002, Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005) simply call “substitutes”. We do this for clarity, since some have defined “substitutes” in other ways. In particular, although Kelso and Crawford’s (1982) definition is equivalent in their model, it is not generally equivalent if it is extend”
• Discrete convex analysis: A tool for economics and game theory (2016, background): “…(1982), has turned out to be crucial in economics; see, e.g., Roth & Sotomayor (1990), Bikhchandani & Mamer (1997), Gul & Stacchetti (1999), Ausubel & Milgrom (2002), Milgrom (2004), Hatfield & Milgrom (2005), Ausubel (2006), Sun & Yang (2006), Milgrom & Strulovici (2009), and Hatfield et…”
• Railway Track Allocation: Models and Algorithms (2012, methodology): “It generalizes the Ausubel Milgrom Proxy Auction presented by Ausubel & Milgrom (2002) [15].”
• Combinatorial auctions (2007, neutral): “1999), the PAUSE mechanism (Kelly and Steinberg 2000), the AkBA family of auctions (Wurman and Wellman 1999a), the iBundle mechanism (Parkes 1999), the ascending proxy auctions (Ausubel and Milgrom 2002), and the clock-proxy auctions (Ausubel et al.”