Auctioning Many Divisible Goods
By Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton. 2004
167 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Management Information Systems, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/000a038db9739df8a8c7850c6565a108577b7572
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In Management Information Systems
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Axel Ockenfels
- Peter Cramton
- Susan Athey
- David McAdams
- Stefan Wager
- Guido W. Imbens
- Philip J. Reny
- Jakub Kastl
In Marketing
Citations in the corpus
- Economics and Design of Capacity Markets for the Power Sector (2012, methodology): “The auction is held using a descending clock procedure (see Ausubel and Cramton 2004). All accepted bids are paid the clearing price, but existing generation receives one-year contracts while new generation may choose any contract length up to seven years. Once a new generator’s initial contract exp”
- Forward reliability markets: Less risk, less market power, more efficiency (2008, unknown): “Keywords: Capacity market; Forward reliability market; ICAP; Adequacy; Reliability; Firm-energy market”
- The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design (2004, unknown): “The experience from a number of high-stakes clock auctions indicates that intra-round bidding lets the auctioneer conduct auctions with several products in about ten rounds, with little or no loss from the discreteness of rounds (Ausubel and Cramton 2004).”
- Combinatorial auctions (2007, unknown): “2001), electricity markets (Ausubel and Cramton 2004; Beraldi et al. 2004), trading (Abrache et al.”
- Simultaneous Ascending Auctions (2004, background): “If we assume no market power and bidding is continuous, then the clock auction is efficient with prices equal to the competitive equilibrium (Ausubel and Cramton 2004).”
- Position Auctions with Consumer Search (2007, background): “Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft allocate the small “sponsored links” one sees at the top and on the right side of their search engine results via similar auction mechanisms.”