Bargaining with Incomplete Information
By Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, R. Deneckere. 2002
338 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/32e48ccf9827e8a954ac76a848faaa668d086ba4
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Citations in the corpus
- The Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights on the Market for Ideas: Evidence from Patent Grant Delays (2008, background): “provides a motivation for inefficient delay (Ausubel et al. 2002).”
- Recovery Before Redemption: A Theory of Delays in Sovereign Debt Renegotiations (2009, unknown): “[5] Ausubel, Lawrence M.”
- Gender Discrimination Estimation in a Search Model with Matching and Bargaining (2005, unknown): “Specifications (3) and (6) estimate jointly prejudice and productivity differences.”
- Farmer Bargaining Power and Market Information Services (2015, unknown): “As shown by Ausubel, Cramton, and Deneckere (2002), because the fully informed agent is making the o ers, there is no possible revision of the probability distribution from one period to the other at the equilibrium, φ1 = φ2 = φ.”
- Government Reputation and Debt Repayment in Emerging Economies (2008, result): “Once political uncertainty is added, still under the assumption of observable types and no renegotiation, the model produces a debt to output ratio that is only 41% of that obtained by the main model.(5) Finally, a model with political uncertainty, full information and endogenous recovery rates and ”
- Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders (2010, methodology): “The fact that equations ( 3 ) and (6) together with the boundary condition K (0) = 1 characterize”