The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design

By Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Paul R. Milgrom. 2004

321 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Information Systems, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b1c34586dacfbc4af29e398924a85ee0f35668ff

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Information Systems

1. Peter Cramton

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Robert W. Day
2. Peter Cramton

In Marketing

1. Robert W. Day
2. Peter Cramton

Citations in the corpus

• The Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rule for Combinatorial Auctions (2008, background): “and Milgrom (2002), and Ausubel et al. (2006) , and the vast positive experience of PowerAuctions, LLC,”
• Combinatorial auctions (2007, unknown): “1999), the PAUSE mechanism (Kelly and Steinberg 2000), the AkBA family of auctions (Wurman and Wellman 1999a), the iBundle mechanism (Parkes 1999), the ascending proxy auctions (Ausubel and Milgrom 2002), and the clock-proxy auctions (Ausubel et al. 2006).”