Intertemporal Price Discrimination

By Hing-Man Leung. 2000

410 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6645a84627d37b0315b90b305c45db4797f1cd24

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

New Results Concerning Probability Distributions with Increasing Generalized Failure Rates (2012, neutral): “Keywords: probability distributions; hazard rate functions; revenue management; supply chain management”
Behavior-Based Price Discrimination and Customer Recognition (2007, background): “In a durable-good context Stokey (1979) shows that when firms can commit to the time path of prices, and C F δ δ = , the monopolist commits to having the same price in”
Customer Behavior Modeling in Revenue Management and Auctions: A Review and New Research Opportunities (2007, methodology): “Dasu and Tong (2006) consider a model in which all customers are present at the start, in the spirit of early papers by Stokey (1979, 1981) and Besanko and Winston (1990).”
Pricing strategies of low-cost airlines: The Ryanair case study (2009, background): “If the flight-filling curve proves optimal, which means that the expected number of average daily bookings is steady over time (Stokey, 1979), the weighted price average against the total number of purchased tickets will equal the temporal average price.”
Conditioning Prices on Purchase History (2005, background): “We are interested in whether the seller can do better by some form of individual conditioning that will allow price discrimination so that the highvalue person pays more than the low-value person.”
Bargaining with Incomplete Information (2002, background): “In terms of a sequential bargaining game, this means that, although it is possible to intertemporally price discriminate, the seller finds it optimal to merely select the static monopoly price of ½ and adhere to it forever (Stokey, 1979).”
Intertemporal Pricing with Strategic Customer Behavior (2007, background): “The earliest attempts to rigorously prove this result are by Stokey (1979, 1981) and Bulow (1982).”
Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers (2008, background): “Research on intertemporal price discrimination that considers forward-looking consumers, such as Stokey (1979) and Lansberger and Meilijson (1985), assume that a monopolist pre-commits to a price strategy for the entire selling horizon in order to maximize expected revenue.”
Dynamic pricing in the presence of inventory considerations: research overview, current practices, and future directions (2003, background): “In addition to the NR-I and R-I-M markets, there is also a large body of literature that focuses on market environments where the seller may replenish inventory and demand is dependent over time (R-D-S [4] [17] [44] [68] [72] and R-D-M [2] [16] [20] [37] [38] [61] [65]).”
Revenue Management with Strategic Customers: Last-Minute Selling and Opaque Selling (2010, background): “Numerous subsequent papers modeled scenarios in which the Coase conjecture may not hold (Stokey 1979, Besanko and Winston 1990, DeGraba 1995).”
Airline Market Power and Intertemporal Price Dispersion (2011, neutral): “In the context of introducing new products on the market, Stokey (1979) studies whether intertemporal price discrimination between early and late adopters can maximize the firm’s profits.”
Intertemporal price discrimination with forward-looking consumers: Application to the US market for console video-games (2007, positive): “The technique is analogous to the approach of Villas-Boas and Winer (1999) and Yang, Chen and Allenby (2003; models 5/10 in Table 2) for household-data, and to the parametric control function approach of Petrin and Train, 2004 (see also the discussion in Chintagunta, Dube and Goh, 2005).”
The Role of the Management Sciences in Research on Personalization (2003, neutral): “Research in second-degree price discrimination has established that a firm should offer multiple versions when consumers have linear valuations and marginal costs are convex in quality (Salant 1989, Spence 1980, Stokey 1979).”