Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem

172 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions (2000, background): “18 On combinatorial bidding, see Bykowsky, et al. (2000) , Charles River Associates and Market Design,”
A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions (2005, background): “Theory, experiment, and practice suggest that, when bidder valuations for multiple objects are superad-ditive, combinatorial auctions are needed to increase efﬁciency, seller revenue, and bidder willingness to participate (Bykowsky et al. 2000, Rassenti et al. 1982, Ledyard et al. 2002).”
Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms (2000, background): “However, this approach has drawbacks, discussed for example in [6].”
The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions (2009, unknown): “In Myerson s (1981) model, the seller maximizes his expected revenue by imposing a reserve price and hence 1See also Bykowsky et al. (2000), and Milgrom (2000).”
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice (2000, background): “Although combinatorial auctions can be approximated by multiple auctions on single items, this often results in inefﬁcient outcomes (Bykowsky, Cull, & Ledyard 2000). i Bundle is the ﬁrst iterative combinatorial auction that is optimal for a reasonable agent bidding strategy, in this case myopic…”