Peter Cramton

Management Science and Operations Research · 2000–2017

A researcher in the Science corpus: 17 papers; trusts 19 researchers and is trusted by 13 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

• Management Science and Operations Research — 64 citations into it; #3,801 of 11,946 by trust here, #795 by citations
• Economics and Econometrics — 51 citations into it; #22,897 of 23,481 by trust here, #11,786 by citations
• Marketing — 50 citations into it; #2,911 of 6,289 by trust here, #2,498 by citations
• Electrical and Electronic Engineering — 31 citations into it; #10,029 of 16,539 by trust here, #7,308 by citations
• Finance — 19 citations into it; #5,582 of 10,518 by trust here, #3,361 by citations
• Management Information Systems — 6 citations into it; #2,363 of 3,376 by trust here, #1,705 by citations
• Accounting — 5 citations into it
• Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality — 5 citations into it

Whom Peter Cramton trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

1. Lawrence M. Ausubel
2. Paul R. Milgrom
3. P. Joskow
4. Steven Stoft
5. S. Borenstein
6. David Newbery
7. Shmuel S. Oren
8. Alvin E. Roth
9. Leon Zolotoy
10. Sandro Brusco

Who trusts Peter Cramton overall

1. Shmuel S. Oren
2. Axel Ockenfels
3. P. Joskow
4. D. Finon
5. David Newbery
6. Andreas Bublitz
7. Virginie Pignon
8. Paul Klemperer
9. Lion Hirth
10. Steven Stoft

Papers from Peter Cramton's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers Peter Cramton trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

1. Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
2. Capacity payments in imperfect electricity markets: Need and design
3. Reliability and Competitive Electricity Markets
4. Competitive Electricity Markets and Investment in New Generating Capacity
5. Intertemporal Price Discrimination
6. Forward reliability markets: Less risk, less market power, more efficiency
7. Multi-Dimensional Procurement Auctions for Power Reserves: Robust Incentive-Compatible Scoring and Settlement Rules
8. The Convergence of Market Designs for Adequate Generating Capacity
9. Dynamic pricing [of electricity] (IEEE potentials)
10. The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics

Their papers

• The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response (2015) — 771 citations
• Auctioning Many Divisible Goods (2004) — 167 citations
• Forward reliability markets: Less risk, less market power, more efficiency (2008) — 130 citations
• Uniform Pricing or Pay-as-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma for California and Beyond (2001) — 153 citations
• Capacity Market Fundamentals (2013) — 365 citations
• Economics and Design of Capacity Markets for the Power Sector (2012) — 271 citations
• Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions (2014) — 392 citations
• The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design (2004) — 321 citations
• Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions (2001) — 154 citations
• Electricity market design (2017) — 342 citations
• The Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rule for Combinatorial Auctions (2008) — 50 citations
• The Convergence of Market Designs for Adequate Generating Capacity (2006) — 258 citations
• A capacity market that makes sense (2005) — 310 citations
• Combinatorial Auctions (2005) — 662 citations
• Simultaneous Ascending Auctions (2004) — 117 citations
• Bargaining with Incomplete Information (2002) — 338 citations
• Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions (2000) — 309 citations