Paul R. Milgrom
Management Science and Operations Research · 2000–2013
A researcher in the Science corpus: 12 papers; trusts 17 researchers and is trusted by 109 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.
Subfields
- Management Science and Operations Research — 58 citations into it; #234 of 12,201 by trust here, #285 by citations
- Economics and Econometrics — 48 citations into it; #727 of 23,545 by trust here, #1,469 by citations
- Marketing — 26 citations into it; #51 of 6,315 by trust here, #147 by citations
- Education — 9 citations into it
- Safety Research — 8 citations into it; #2,669 of 5,835 by trust here, #4,800 by citations
Whom Paul R. Milgrom trusts overall
Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu
- Paul Klemperer
- Susan Athey
- Amartya Sen
- Roger B. Myerson
- Ilya Segal
- Alvin E. Roth
- D. Parkes
- Parag A. Pathak
Who trusts Paul R. Milgrom overall
- Peter Cramton
- Yinlam Chow
- Eric Budish
- Bettina Klaus
- Tayfun Sönmez
- John William Hatfield
- Michael Arbel
- Jonathan D. Levin
- Marek Kapicka
- Lawrence M. Ausubel
Papers from Paul R. Milgrom's perspective
Ordered by how strongly the researchers Paul R. Milgrom trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.
- Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
- Optimal Auction Design
- Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem (Journal of Economics Theory)
- A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions (Management Sciences)
- Last Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from a Natural Experiment on the Internet
- Controlled Markov processes and viscosity solutions
- Optimization by Vector Space Methods
- The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold‐up and Risk Sharing)
Their papers
- Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004) — 1,721 citations
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets (2002) — 1,417 citations
- Matching with Contracts (2005) — 912 citations
- Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (2002) — 745 citations
- Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications (2013) — 389 citations
- The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (2004) — 681 citations
- The economic nature of the firm: Bargaining costs, influence costs, and the organization of economic activity (2009) — 134 citations
- What the Seller Won't Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets (2008) — 179 citations
- Core-selecting package auctions (2008) — 314 citations
- Introduction to Choice Theory (2004) — 105 citations
- The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design (2004) — 321 citations
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding II (2000) — 213 citations