An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects

By Lawrence M. Ausubel. 2004

802 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fa4334297f5a3d99240c846b783b03475ce0e956

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Citations in the corpus

Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions (2014, neutral): “The uniform-price auction is not a panacea, since unlike its unit-demand counterpart it inevitably yields inefficiency, whereas some alternative multi-unit designs do not (see Vickrey, 1961; Ausubel, 2004).”
Funding Liquidity Risk: Definition and Measurement (2013, neutral): “15 In a multi-unit set-up the winner’s curse problem is also referred to as champion’s plague (Ausubel, 2004)”
The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (2004, methodology): “We offer our own candidate designs in Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) and in chapters 3 and 5 of this book.”
On the Asymptotic Distribution of the Transaction Price in a Clock Model of a Multi-Unit, Oral, Ascending-Price Auction within the Common-Value Paradigm (2013, background): “While no similar result has been proven for multi-unit (or multi-object) auctions, it is sometimes argued, loosely, that information release will improve the performance of an auction format; see, for example, Ausubel [2] who has investigated the case of multi-unit auctions at which potential buyers”
Managing Online Auctions: Current Business and Research Issues (2003, background): “Lucking-Reiley (2000) also points out that this is an area in which developments in auction theory may improve the design of online auctions through the use of more sophisticated mechanisms that prevent demand reduction (Ausubel 1997, Ausubel and Cramton 1996).”
The Limits of ex post Implementation (2006, background): “…shown that e¢ cient ex-post implementation is possible when signals are one-dimensional and satisfy a single-crossing property (see Cremer and McLean, 1985; Maskin, 1992; Ausubel, 1997; Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000; Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001; Bergemann and Välimäki, 2002; and Perry and Reny, 2002).”
The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design (2004, neutral): “All bids are kept live throughout the auction.”
Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms (2017, neutral): “(Ausubel, 2004) In this paper, I model what it means for a mechanism to be obviously strategy-proof.”
Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information (2008, background): “27 Our results are perhaps more closely related to the generalized winner’s curse or “champion’s plague” pointed out in Ausubel (2004) for multi-unit auctions according to which, and translated in our context, the expected cost of a bidder conditional on being allocated a larger quantity is larger t”