The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction

By Lawrence M. Ausubel, Paul R. Milgrom. 2004

681 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4d92838c1357e132987d82ad3c6a426141a7f8cd

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Citations in the corpus

Data Collection and Wireless Communication in Internet of Things (IoT) Using Economic Analysis and Pricing Models: A Survey (2016, background): “actually a generalized Vickrey auction with multiple items for sale [77].”
The Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rule for Combinatorial Auctions (2008, background): “may refer to Rothkopf 2007, Ausubel and Milgrom 2006, or Rothkopf et al. 1990, for example.) We instead”
Core-selecting package auctions (2008, background): “4 For a more thorough treatment, see Ausubel and Milgrom (2005) .”
Combinatorial auctions (2007, neutral): “(Ausubel and Milgrom, 2006) showed that the Vickrey auction leads to such core allocations only when the goods-are-substitutes condition holds for all bidders and bidders’ budgets are unlimited.”
Some simple economics of the blockchain (2016, neutral): “One example of this is the second-price auction that was developed by William Vickery (see Ausubel and Milgrom, 2006).”
A Survey on Big Data Market: Pricing, Trading and Protection (2018, background): “Seal-bid Auctions have been well explored, and typical examples include the k th-price auction [125], [126], VCG auction [127], [128], and McAfee auction [113].”
Balancing efficiency and fairness in heterogeneous GPU clusters for deep learning (2020, background): “Gandivafair addresses this pricing dilemma by borrowing from the second-price auction mechanisms that have been extensively studied [8].”
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing (2010, background): “In single-dimensional settings, the advantages of sequential posted pricings speak to the many reasons optimal auctions are rarely seen in practice [1], and explain why posted pricings are ubiquitous [15].”