Optimal Auction Design

By Roger B. Myerson. 1981

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Citations in the corpus

Counterfactual reasoning and learning systems: the example of computational advertising (2012, background): “Auction theory explains how to design a mechanism that optimizes the revenue of the seller of a single object (Myerson, 1981; Milgrom, 2004) under various assumptions about the”
Monopoly with Resale (2006, background): “Following Myerson (1982), we can thus replicate the outcome induced by any indirect mechanism (\/f, M, S) through a direct mechanism 0 : 0# ?? R x A({0,1} x Z) in which B must report his type to S and then with probability (?>(z \ 0B) := Pt(jc = 1,z = z\0r) trade occurs and a recommendation z = (tr(”
Revenue maximization with a single sample (2010, background): “F (p)); alternatively, applying Myerson s Lemma to the single-bidder case shows * ** = .”
Toward Controlling Discrimination in Online Ad Auctions (2019, methodology): “Formally, building on Myerson’s seminal work [37], we characterize the truthful revenue-optimal mechanism which satisfies the given constraints (Theorem 4.1).”
Supply Disruptions, Asymmetric Information, and a Backup Production Option (2009, unknown): “This approach dates back to the seminal work by Myerson (1981).”
The Economic Incentives for Sharing Security Information (2005, background): “Hence the interim individual rationality constraints (IR1) or (IR2) are binding irrespective of the realization of i c (see Myerson 1979, 1981 ).”
The Economics of Multidimensional Screening (2003, background): “…Goldman, Leland, and Sibley (1984) for nonlinear pricing,Mussa andRosen (1978) for imperfect competition in differentiated industries, Baron and Myerson (1982), Baron and Besanko (1984), McAfee and McMillan (1987), and Laffont and Tirole (1986, 1993) for regulation, and Myerson (1981) for auctions.”
Corruption in Procurement and Public Purchase (2006, background): “…cost parameters are independently and identically distributed, it is optimal under asymmetry of information to organize a second price type of auction (see Myerson (1981)).14 The rent that a producer gets on expectation when he is one of N bidders of such an auction is: EΠi N = Q ∫ β β [1− F…”
Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement (2007, background): “characterization of the optimal auction rule in this context, which an incumbent will choose after the bundle auction, goes back to Myerson (1981) :”
Combination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions (2007, background): “The argument for this claim relies on a version of the revenue equivalence theorem (Myerson, 1981).”
Mechanism Choice and Strategic Bidding in Divisible Good Auctions: An Empirical Analysis of the Turkish Treasury Auction Market (2010, background): “In the case where bidders have demand for only a single unit of the good being sold, the celebrated revenue equivalence theorem of Vickrey (1961) and Myerson (1981) and the revenue ranking results of Milgrom and Weber (1982a) can be used to compare the expected revenues of the different mechanisms.”
Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly (2007, background): “Lemma 4’s characterization of the extreme points of W immediately provides an alternative and simple proof of various well-known results which we summarize below [14].”
Display Advertising with Real-Time Bidding (RTB) and Behavioural Targeting (2016, methodology): “Although these distributions are widely adopted in research literature [Myerson, 1981, Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2009], only a small portion of tests returned positive results as shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.3.”