Is Addiction “Rational”? Theory and Evidence
By Jonathan Gruber, B. Kőszegi. 2001
1,101 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Clinical Psychology, Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b922655c85991072d09f94706a90dd2c9f56c3af
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Clinical Psychology
- Mark Rush
- W. Congdon
- Olof Johansson-Stenman
- Emmanuel Farhi
- Mohammed Abdellaoui
- Arthur E. Attema
- Sendhil Mullainathan
- Colin F. Camerer
In Economics and Econometrics
- Joshua Schwartzstein
- Han Bleichrodt
- Emmanuel Farhi
- Xavier Gabaix
- Mohammed Abdellaoui
- Sendhil Mullainathan
- Kjell Arne Brekke
- Mark Rush
In General Decision Sciences
- Joshua Schwartzstein
- Han Bleichrodt
- Sendhil Mullainathan
- Teck-Hua Ho
- Emmanuel Farhi
- Noah Lim
- Mohammed Abdellaoui
- Xavier Gabaix
Citations in the corpus
- Some fundamental problems in Becker, Grossman and Murphy's implementation of rational addiction theory (2004, neutral): “Baltagi and Grin [1], and Gruber and K¨oszegi [ 3 ].”
- Declining Discount Rates: The Long and the Short of it (2005, neutral): “Harris and Laibson (2001) note that a large number of such experiments has been conducted, with a variety of rewards such as money, durable goods, sweets, relief from noise and so on.(38) The results from these experiments suggest quite strongly that the discount rate applying to consumption trade-o”
- Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence (2004, neutral): “for leisure and neutral goods (b ≤ 0) and LR ≥ k/βδ (16)”
- Interpreting pre-trends as anticipation: Impact on estimated treatment effects from tort reform (2015, neutral): “Estimating the quasi-myopic model requires the researcher either to instrument for that model's future expectations, which bring up analogous problems, or to assume perfect foresight, which is difficult to justify (Gruber and Koszegi, 2001).”
- Self-control, revealed preference and consumption choice (2004, neutral): “For example, Gruber and Koszegi (2001) compute optimal taxes for the period 0 utility and conclude that smokers would be better off with high cigarette taxes.”
- Optimal Taxation with Behavioral Agents (2020, positive): “As an example, consider the case of a smoker, calibrated using numbers from Gruber and Kőszegi (2004).(4) He smokes cj = 1 pack a day.”
- Modeling the Psychology of Consumer and Firm Behavior with Behavioral Economics (2006, positive): “…self-control problems such as procrastination and deadline-setting (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999a; 1999b; 2001) and addiction (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999c; 2002; Gruber and Koszegi 2001).16 A natural question that arises is whether decision makers are aware that they are discounting hyperbolically.”
- Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence (2008, neutral): “More recent examples include the analysis of cigarette consumption and addiction when preferences are time-inconsistent (Gruber and Koszegi 2001); optimal taxes on sin goods (O Donoghue and Rabin 2006); and optimal retirement savings policies for hyperbolic agents (Amador et al. 2006).”
- Alcohol taxation and regulation in the European Union (2007, positive): “2000), or behave in a dynamically inconsistent fashion (Gruber and Koszegi 2001) by discounting costs and benefits in the near future to a greater extent than those in the long term.”
- Fair Air: Distributive Justice and Environmental Economics (2010, neutral): “For example, Gruber and Köszegi (2001) argue in favor of cigarette taxation, not in order to internalize externalities (which they argue are rather small, anyway), but rather in order to internalize what they denote internalities, i.e., in order to help them act consistent with their own ultimate…”