The Package Assignment Model
By Sushil Bikhchandani, Joseph M. Ostroy. Journal of Economics Theory, 2002
363 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/80e50ba5af59e33d5c139c22b199b74056a271ae
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- D. Parkes
- Ilya Segal
- Michael H. Rothkopf
- Aleksandar Sasa Pekec
- Lyle Ungar
- Noam Nisan
- John O. Ledyard
- Robert J. Cull
In Management Science and Operations Research
- D. Parkes
- Ilya Segal
- Lyle Ungar
- Michael H. Rothkopf
- Aleksandar Sasa Pekec
- Noam Nisan
- John O. Ledyard
- Paul R. Milgrom
In Marketing
- Ilya Segal
- D. Parkes
- Aleksandar Sasa Pekec
- Michael H. Rothkopf
- Lyle Ungar
- Noam Nisan
- John O. Ledyard
- Marek Kapicka
Citations in the corpus
- Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice (2000, background): “In fact, the optimal solution to [ LP 2 ] is integral and solves [ IP ] if and only if non-discriminatory bundle prices exist that support the optimal allocation in competitive equilibrium with best-response agent bidding strategies (Bikchandani & Ostroy 1998).”
- The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices (2006, methodology): “This general notion of price equilibrium was first suggested by Mas-Colell [33] and later used by Bikhchandani and Mamer [7] and Bikhchandani and Ostroy [8] for combinatorial allocation problems.”
- Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem (2000, result): “More recent results can be found in Bikhchandani and Ostroy (1998).”
- Combinatorial auction design (2003, background): “, b a b c = 5 and, if so, how should it be derived? Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) show that determining market-clearing prices (so that each bidder is maximizing its profits in the revenue-maximizing allocation) is not trivial.”
- A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions (2005, background): “Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) took this further and looked at personalized (individual specific) prices on packages.”
- The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (2010, neutral): “F, i.e. ( 13 ) and (14), this means that F(ep�) � F(p�).”
- Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets* (2013, neutral): “…in auction markets (Gul and Stacchetti 2000; Milgrom 2004; Sun and Yang 2009), general equilibrium with indivisible goods (Gul and Stacchetti 1999; Bikhchandani and Ostroy 2002; Sun and Yang 2006), and matching markets (Ostrovsky 2008; Hatfield and Kominers 2009; Sönmez and Ünver 2010; Pycia…”
- Combinatorial auctions (2007, neutral): “Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) propose two extended formulations of the CAP.”