The Fit Between CEO Compensation Design and Firm Risk

By Janice S. Miller, Robert M. Wiseman, Luis R. Gómez-Mejía. 2002

244 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/66e2a902dab3adb73e983e0720ff8c4ab35c194f

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Citations in the corpus

The Resilient Family Firm: Stakeholder Outcomes and Institutional Effects (2015, background): “Comparable to Miller, Wiseman, and Gómez-Mejia (2002), we also controlled for systematic and unsystematic firm risk (Sig R and Sig E).”
Assessing Managerial Power Theory (2015, background): “…and Westphal 2008 AMJ McGuire, Chiu, and Elbing 1962 AER McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd 2003 JBE Mehran 1992 JFQA Meyer and Elayan 2005 WP Miller 1995 AMJ Miller, Wiseman, and Gomez-Mejia 2002 AMJ Mir and Seboui 2008 CG Mitsudome, Weintrop, and Hwang 2008 JJIE Moeller 2005 JFE Mohan 2004 WP Murphy…”
Innovative Knowledge Assets and Economic Performance: The Asymmetric Roles of Incentives and Monitoring (2009, background): “We measured CEO contingency pay as the proportion of bonuses, longterm incentive payments, and stock options in the CEO's total compensation (Miller et al., 2002).”
The Anglo-American financial influence on CEO compensation in non-Anglo-American firms (2005, background): “This study is an attempt to address the lack of research on the issue of contagion in the field of internationalisation and corporate governance (Melin, 1992; Miller et al., 2002).”
Too Good to be True: Board Structural Independence as a Moderator of CEO Pay-for-Firm-Performance (2011, unknown): “…risk factors will attenuate the association between CEO pay and firm-level performance (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007; Miller et al., 2002; Mishra et al., 2000; Tosi et al., © 2010 The Authors Journal of Management Studies © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and Society…”
The Effects of Endowment and Loss Aversion in Managerial Stock Option Valuation (2007, unknown): “Miller, Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia (2002) , which show that use of variable forms of pay in”
6 Pay and Performance: Individuals, Groups, and Executives (2009, background): “Similarly, if firm performance is highly variable, this also introduces an element of risk that has been shown to increase the overall required level of pay, reduce the use of incentive pay, and/or result in weaker pay/performance linkages (Aggarwal & Samwick, 1999a ; Bloom & Milkovich, 1998 ; Gra”
The personalization privacy paradox: An exploratory study of decision making process for location-aware marketing (2011, background): “It has been argued, particularly inmanagement literature, that risk is positively related to value [46].”
Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments (2007, unknown): “Finally, Miller, Wiseman, and Gomez-Mejia (2002) examined the effects of market (systematic) and firmspecific (unsystematic) risk on CEO compensation.”
CEOS ON THE EDGE: EARNINGS MANIPULATION AND STOCK-BASED INCENTIVE MISALIGNMENT (2008, background): “Miller, Wiseman, and Gomez-Mejia (2002) suggested that moderate levels of risk in CEO compensation are the most likely to be advantageous to shareholders.”