Too Good to be True: Board Structural Independence as a Moderator of CEO Pay-for-Firm-Performance

By A. Capezio, J. Shields, M. O’Donnell. 2011

119 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f6630ac98344047fc555059675247a24f39b3975

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Tensie Steijvers
2. A. Michiels
3. Wim Voordeckers
4. Nadine Lybaert

In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

1. Tensie Steijvers
2. A. Michiels
3. Wim Voordeckers
4. Nadine Lybaert

In Strategy and Management

1. A. Michiels
2. Nadine Lybaert
3. Wim Voordeckers
4. Tensie Steijvers

Citations in the corpus

• CEO Compensation in Private Family Firms (2013, methodology): “Firm performance is operationalized through the accounting return measure “return on assets” (ROA, income after expenses excluding taxes divided by total assets) because the majority of studies investigating the pay-for-performance relation use ROA as the measure of firm performance (Banghøj et al.,”
• Corporate Boards, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance in an Environment of Severe Political and Economic Crisis (2012, unknown): “This approach is more appropriate because it removes the contamination through an identified finite-sample corrected set of equations that are robust to panel-specific autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (Roodman, 2009; Capezio et al., 2010).”