6 Pay and Performance: Individuals, Groups, and Executives

By B. Gerhart, S. Rynes, I. Fulmer. 2009

277 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Management Information Systems

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0ed340d16d648e6f9e4e100e81d3a889d0f58db0

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Citations in the corpus

Do Corporate Social Performance Targets in Executive Compensation Contribute to Corporate Social Performance? (2016, background): “In the many decades of scholarly research into directors’ compensation, agency theory is the most commonly used theoretical perspective (for good overviews see Gerhart et al. 2009; Larkin et al. 2012).”
Signaling in Secret: Pay-for-Performance and the Incentive and Sorting Effects of Pay Secrecy (2014, background): “However, when such objective data are either less readily available, or do not provide a real-time and comprehensive indication of both output and quality, organizations are likely to have little choice but to rely on noisier, more subjective performance assessment methods (Gerhart et al., 2009).”
Pay-for-Performance’s Effect on Future Employee Performance (2016, background): “For example, while our results support the position that merit pay is positively related to future performance (e.g., Gerhart et al., 2009), they also shed light on why many studies may have struggled to find these results.”
Do you get what you pay for? Sales incentives and implications for motivation and changes in turnover intention and work effort (2016, methodology): “…instrumentality between performance and reward, though by no means the only one, as other considerations, such as whether performance is measured by results versus behaviors and whether the reward is group or individualbased can also affect instrumentality perceptions (Gerhart et al. 2009).”
Agency Theory Revisited: CEO Return and Shareholder Interest Alignment (2010, background): “Nevertheless, because earnings are imperfectly related to shareholder return, and because most CEO firm-specific wealth is generated via equity positions (Gerhart et al., 2009), we expect a weaker relationship between alignment and earnings than between alignment and shareholder return.”
Pay, Intrinsic Motivation, Extrinsic Motivation, Performance, and Creativity in the Workplace: Revisiting Long-Held Beliefs (2015, background): “…defined to include any plan where pay depends on performance, with the specific PFP plan being a function of two performance measurement decisions (Gerhart et al., 2009): degree of emphasis on results or behaviors and on individual or aggregate (i.e., group, unit, or organization) level of…”