CEOS ON THE EDGE: EARNINGS MANIPULATION AND STOCK-BASED INCENTIVE MISALIGNMENT

By Xiaomeng Zhang, Kathryn M. Bartol, Ken G. Smith, Michael D. Pfarrer, Dmitry M. Khanin. 2008

245 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/722c69034a7635eb8d56094d5e2142dd5f19e78c

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Citations in the corpus

Romancing leadership: Past, present, and future ☆ (2011, background): “…Bettman and Weitz (1983); Meindl and Ehrlich (1987); Puffer (1990); Staw et al. (1983); Westphal and Zajac (1994) (1998) Alexander and Cohen (1996); Zhang et al. (2008) Biased attributions for organizational failure: when others assign blame Leaders are often blamed for failures outside of their…”
Managerial Risk Taking (2016, unknown): “Additionally, unethical behaviors associated with risk taking (Baucus & Near, 1991; Harris & Bromiley, 2007; Mishina et al., 2010; Troy et al., 2011; X. Zhang et al., 2008) can lead firms to suffer significant reputational damage or performance fluctuation/decline.”
Organizations Gone Wild: The Causes, Processes, and Consequences of Organizational Misconduct (2010, result): “high level of potential stock-option compensation are more likely to manipulate accounts in order to influence their firm’s stock value (e.g., Harris & Bromiley, 2007; Zhang et al., 2008), consistent with the influence prediction.”
Strategic leadership in organizational crises: A review and research agenda (2021, background): “A suitable approach to elucidate directors’ personality and values could combine quantitative elements—e.g., questionnaires (Carmeli and Sheaffer, 2009) or proxy measures (McClelland et al., 2010)—and qualitative elements—e.g., in-depth interviews (Zona et al., 2013).”
Why 'Good' Firms Do Bad Things: The Effects of High Aspirations, High Expectations and Prominence on the Incidence of Corporate Illegality (2010, unknown): “Such an action is considered an example of corporate illegality even if individual executives benefit from the resultant stock increase ( Zhang, Bartol, Smith, Pfarrer & Khanin, 2008 ), because the illegal action was intended to enhance corporate performance and the stock price increase benefits all”
Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud in China (2014, unknown): “Financial fraud is also affected by the design of executive incentive compensation contracts (Harris and Bromiley 2007; O’Connor Jr. et al. 2006; Zhang et al. 2008).”
Customer-Centric Science: Reporting Significant Research Results With Rigor, Relevance, and Practical Impact in Mind (2010, background): “The use of these incentives would then lead to greater earnings manipulation behaviors, resulting in some firms experiencing severe declines in their stock price, exposure to reputational damage, top management turnover, possible bankruptcies, and loss of general investor confidence (Zhang et al., 2”
The age-effect of financial indicators as buffers against the liability of newness ☆ (2010, background): “First, there is a perceived increase in the discretion in financial reporting (Beaver et al., 2005) and suggestions that executives may inappropriately use this discretion to manipulate financial reports for their own gain (e.g., Beaver et al., 2005; O'Connor et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2008).”
CEO demographics and accounting fraud: Who is more likely to rationalize illegal acts? (2011, background): “Prior research has established an association of high levels of CEO stock options with higher levels of financial statement fraud (Zhang et al., 2008).”