The Effects of Endowment and Loss Aversion in Managerial Stock Option Valuation

By Cynthia E. Devers, Robert M. Wiseman, R. M. Holmes. 2007

128 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a5debc5de8ff2319d1e997410bee6b8daaa581c1

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Citations in the corpus

Managerial Risk Taking (2016, unknown): “Reflecting these concerns, Devers et al. (2007) caution that firm risk, often captured by accounting measures, may not reflect executives’ attitudes and biases toward risk.”
Agency Theory Revisited: CEO Return and Shareholder Interest Alignment (2010, background): “Eisenhardt (1989) concluded that the accumulated empirical evidence was supportive of outcome-based contracts as an effective alignment tool and a remedy for many agency problems.”
CEOS ON THE EDGE: EARNINGS MANIPULATION AND STOCK-BASED INCENTIVE MISALIGNMENT (2008, methodology): “Although different measures for stock options have been used in other studies, including spread value (current stock price minus grant price [Devers et al., 2007]) and Black- Scholes valuation (O’Connor et al., 2006), we used number of options because it was necessary to differentiate between those…”
Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments (2007, unknown): “Although the majority of compensation research values stock options using normative financial option models, the theory and evidence put forth by Devers et al. (2007) highlight that there are agency costs associated with stock options that reduce their efficiency as incentive alignment mechanisms.”
Moving Closer to the Action: Examining Compensation Design Effects on Firm Risk (2008, background): “…stock reflects high value immediately on award (similar to how executives are thought to include the value of shares owned as personal wealth) (Devers et al. 2007, Sanders 2001), we argue that CEOs are likely to endow their perceptions of personal wealth with the accumulated value from…”
Disentangling compensation and employment risks using the behavioral agency model (2007, background): “Although this is certainly possible, several studies done after the market decline of 2000–01 find that an optimism bias regarding the valuation of stock options continues to exist (Larcker and Lambert, 2001; Devers, Wiseman, and Holmes, 2007).”
Management Theory Applications of Prospect Theory: Accomplishments, Challenges, and Opportunities (2011, unknown): “Extending this insight, Devers, Wiseman, and Holmes (2007) used a policy capturing approach to examine the subjective values managers placed on stock options.”
Publishing in AMJ—Part 2: Research Design (2011, methodology): “Illustrating this notion of matching research question with sample is a study on the valuation of equity-based pay in which Devers, Wiseman, and Holmes (2007) used a sample of executive MBA students, nearly all of whom had experience with contingent pay.”