A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem

By Anna Bogomolnaia, Hervé Moulin. Journal of Economics Theory, 2001

902 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d2ceab98e96695ea58f919e1141e7aff5d6088ab

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Citations in the corpus

Decomposing random mechanisms (2015, neutral): “(2) and (3) above, and φ(%; i, x1)− φ(%; j, x1) = 0 ∀i, j ∈ I, ∀x1 ∈ O1, ∀ %∈ D. 11 See Bogomolnaia andMoulin (2001).”
Assignment Mechanisms under Distributional Constraints (2018, methodology): “Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) find that no mechanism is ordinally efficient, envy-free, and strategyproof in the context of allocating indivisible objects to homogeneous agents.”
A theory of school‐choice lotteries (2015, methodology): “Our approach, inspired in part by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001), also rests on the idea of avoiding welfare losses emanating from random tie-breaking. for lottery mechanisms, such as the ones used for school choice, it is much less clear that it is the most suitable fairness property for this setup.”
Pairwise kidney exchange (2005, positive): “By Lemma 2.1 in Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2002), for each pre-allocation there is a pre-lottery that induces it.”
Asymptotic ordinal inefficiency of random serial dictatorship (2009, positive): “However, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) show that this mechanism may result in unambiguous efficiency loss.”
When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient (2012, background): “Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) give a more detailed discussion on this last point.”
Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice (2015, background): “A similar logic implies that we cannot have cB S b.(9) Hence, φ admits no trading cycle.”
Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems (2002, background): “The problem in which each agent initially owns an object, known as the housing market , is due toShapley and Scarf (1974) .”
Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications (2013, background): “A constraint structure H is a hierarchy if, for every pair of elements S and S ′ in H, we have S ⊂ S ′ or S ′ ⊂ S or S ∩ S ′ = ∅.9 That is, H is a hierarchy if, for any two of its elements, one of them is a subset of the other or they are disjoint.”
A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects (2014, background): “This model has numerous real-life applications; the objects may, for example, be housing units, jobs, seats at public schools, time slots for the use of a machine, or organs for transplant [3, 4, 6, 23].”
Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism (2014, background): “In a seminal paper, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) (BM hereafter) proposed the probabilistic serial mechanism (PS), which is sd-efficient and sd-envy-free.”
Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources (2015, neutral): “Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973; Roberts, 1979); by Barberà, Jackson, and Neme (1997) for sharing a perfectly divisible good among agents with single-peaked preferences over their shares(cf.”
A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution (2002, methodology): “In the companion paper [ 3 ], we apply the concept of ordinal efficiency to random assignment with arbitrary preferences and define the Probabilistic Serial assignment, a central point within the set of ordinally efficient assignments: this definition generalizes that of the current paper.”