Jonathan D. Levin

Economics and Econometrics · 2001–2018

A researcher in the Science corpus: 19 papers; trusts 38 researchers and is trusted by 62 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

• Economics and Econometrics — 114 citations into it; #1,197 of 23,481 by trust here, #889 by citations
• Management Science and Operations Research — 75 citations into it; #1,933 of 11,946 by trust here, #1,207 by citations
• Marketing — 56 citations into it; #633 of 6,289 by trust here, #414 by citations
• Accounting — 39 citations into it; #2,477 of 8,970 by trust here, #1,922 by citations
• Safety Research — 21 citations into it; #776 of 5,829 by trust here, #2,001 by citations
• Strategy and Management — 20 citations into it; #3,477 of 10,874 by trust here, #4,065 by citations
• Finance — 17 citations into it; #4,938 of 10,518 by trust here, #2,404 by citations
• Management Information Systems — 11 citations into it

Whom Jonathan D. Levin trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

1. Daron Acemoglu
2. Debraj Ray
3. B. Klein
4. Pat Bajari
5. Paul R. Milgrom
6. Martin Pesendorfer
7. M. Jofre-Bonet
8. Philip A. Haile
9. Susan Athey
10. Liran Einav

Who trusts Jonathan D. Levin overall

1. Rocco Macchiavello
2. M. Warner
3. G. Bel
4. Jean-Charles Rochet
5. Ron Siegel
6. Simon Board
7. A. Hefetz
8. Liran Einav
9. Jean Tirole
10. A. Morjaria

Papers from Jonathan D. Levin's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers Jonathan D. Levin trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

1. Optimal Auction Design
2. Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game
3. Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field
4. Deciding Between Competition and Collusion (Review of Economics and Statistics)
5. Pennies from Ebay: The Determinants of Price in Online Auctions
6. A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
7. Large Sample Properties of Matching Estimators for Average Treatment Effects
8. THE TIME STRUCTURE OF SELF-ENFORCING AGREEMENTS
9. Economic Insights from Internet Auctions
10. Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts

Their papers

• Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition (2004) — 1,057 citations
• Liquidity Constraints and Imperfect Information in Subprime Lending (2009) — 396 citations
• Contract Pricing in Consumer Credit Markets (2012) — 190 citations
• Relational Incentive Contracts (2003) — 703 citations
• Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions (2004) — 203 citations
• Matching and Price Competition (2006) — 164 citations
• Contracting for Government Services: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Cities (2010) — 473 citations
• Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions (2008) — 342 citations
• Assessing Sale Strategies in Online Markets Using Matched Listings (2015) — 121 citations
• Multilateral Contracting and the Employment Relationship (2002) — 199 citations
• The Data Revolution and Economic Analysis (2014) — 393 citations
• Early Admissions at Selective Colleges (2010) — 130 citations
• Sales Taxes and Internet Commerce (2014) — 178 citations
• Auctions versus Posted Prices in Online Markets (2018) — 153 citations
• SET-ASIDES AND SUBSIDIES IN AUCTIONS (2013) — 156 citations
• Learning Self-Control (2011) — 145 citations
• Empirical Industrial Organization: A Progress Report (2010) — 155 citations
• Introduction to Choice Theory (2004) — 105 citations
• Information and the Market for Lemons (2001) — 165 citations