Putting Auction Theory to Work

By Paul R. Milgrom. 2004

1,721 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

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Citations in the corpus

Counterfactual reasoning and learning systems: the example of computational advertising (2012, background): “Auction theory explains how to design a mechanism that optimizes the revenue of the seller of a single object (Myerson, 1981; Milgrom, 2004) under various assumptions about the information available to the buyers regarding the intentions of the other buyers.”
Pairwise kidney exchange (2005, neutral): “24 See for instance Roth and Peranson [48], Roth [47], Wilson [62], Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez [6], Milgrom [33], Niederle and Roth [34,35], Crawford [15], Abdulkadiroğlu et al.”
Is There a Market for Ideas (2010, neutral): “From the design and operation of government auctions for telecommunications spectrum (McMillan, 1994; Milgrom, 2004; Klemperer, 2004; Cramton, 2002, 2008) to the evaluation of algorithms for “matching” medical residents with hospitals (Roth, 2002), to the development of online auctions for search…”
Individuals and Teams in UMTS-License Auctions (2007, background): “Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck, Universitaetsstrasse 15/4, A6020 Innsbruck, Austria. e-mail: matthias.sutter@uibk.ac.at 1”
All One Needs to Know about Metaverse: A Complete Survey on Technological Singularity, Virtual Ecosystem, and Research Agenda (2021, methodology): “In addition, well-known real-life auctioning methods for goods with some degrees of common values such as Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism [641] and Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction [642] can also be introduced in the virtual twin for virtual properties like franchises for operating essential serv”
Core-selecting package auctions (2008, background): “15 A detailed derivation can be found in Milgrom (2004) .”
The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match (2017, background): “Recent work by Kapor, Neilson, and Zimmerman (2016) surveys parents to elicit their beliefs about admissions probabilities in the New Haven choice mechanism and incorporate them as part of an empirical strategy to simulate alternative mechanisms.”
Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions (2009, background): “Since the probability density of the highest value among is ()−1() per-bidder expected surplus = 1 R = ()−1() {−()} =R = [1− ()]−1().”
The Democratization of Personal Consumer Loans? Determinants of Success in Online Peer-to-peer Lending Communities (2008, background): “No discrepancies were found between the coding of the two assistants, and these data elements were deemed to be accurate.”
The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response (2015, methodology): “The CME dataset is called CME Globex DataMine Market Depth.”
An introduction to the theory of mechanism design (2015, background): “The results on dominant strategy mechanisms in the single unit auction setting are special cases of a more general result in Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) who investigate conditions under which one can construct for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms an equivalent dominant strategy me”