Paul Klemperer

Economics and Econometrics · 2000–2019

A researcher in the Science corpus: 10 papers; trusts 18 researchers and is trusted by 27 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

• Economics and Econometrics — 44 citations into it; #6,161 of 23,481 by trust here, #10,386 by citations
• Management Science and Operations Research — 43 citations into it; #1,401 of 11,946 by trust here, #2,539 by citations
• Strategy and Management — 36 citations into it; #1,475 of 10,874 by trust here, #2,547 by citations
• Marketing — 35 citations into it; #363 of 6,289 by trust here, #816 by citations
• Media Technology — 10 citations into it
• Accounting — 9 citations into it
• Geometry and Topology — 6 citations into it
• Computational Theory and Mathematics — 5 citations into it

Whom Paul Klemperer trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

1. Paul R. Milgrom
2. Ken Binmore
3. Murillo Campello
4. Kerry Back
5. G. Mikhalkin
6. John William Hatfield
7. Peter Cramton
8. Ning Sun
9. Roger B. Myerson
10. Jaime F. Zender

Who trusts Paul Klemperer overall

1. Matthias Sutter
2. Xavier Vives
3. Ken Binmore
4. Leigh Tesfatsion
5. Natalia Fabra
6. Martin G. Kocher
7. Thomas W. Hazlett
8. Alvin E. Roth
9. Sabine Strauß
10. Paul R. Milgrom

Papers from Paul Klemperer's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers Paul Klemperer trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

1. Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
2. Optimal Auction Design
3. How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3g Telecom Auctions
4. Matching with Contracts
5. Equilibria and Indivisibilities: Gross Substitutes and Complements
6. Enumerative tropical algebraic geometry
7. Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply
8. What Really Matters in Auction Design: the European Spectrum Auctions
9. Capital Structure and Product Markets Interactions: Evidence from Business Cycles
10. Enumerative tropical algebraic geometry in R^2

Their papers

• How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3g Telecom Auctions (2002) — 392 citations
• The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3g Telecom Licences (2001) — 297 citations
• The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods (2010) — 113 citations
• Understanding Preferences: “Demand Types”, and the Existence of Equilibrium With Indivisibilities (2019) — 134 citations
• Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions (2009) — 197 citations
• Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects (2006) — 1,351 citations
• Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory (2003) — 110 citations
• The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of British 3G Telecom Licences (2001) — 138 citations
• What Really Matters in Auction Design: the European Spectrum Auctions (2000) — 946 citations
• The Economic Theory of Auctions (2000) — 170 citations