What the Seller Won't Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets

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Price of Transparency in Strategic Machine Learning (2016, background): “There exists a substantial amount of literature in information economics on communicating information in senser-receiver games: using as advertising [12], [13], education [14], disclosure of verifiable information [15], or cheap talk [16], or information disclosure[17], [18].”
To Review or Not to Review? Limited Strategic Thinking at the Movie Box Office (2012, unknown): “Whether there is complete unraveling, in theory, is sensitive to some of the simplifying assumptions (see Milgrom 2008).”
Information-Theoretic Approach to Strategic Communication as a Hierarchical Game (2015, background): “Overview of Communication Games in Economics There exists a vast amount of literature in economics on communicating information in transmitter–receiver games: using as advertising [17], [18], education [19], disclosure of verifiable information [20], or cheap talk [6], or information disclosure [3],”
Preparation for Retirement, Financial Literacy and Cognitive Resources (2008, unknown): “We also thank Cynthia Doniger for excellent research assistance.”