Core-selecting package auctions

By Robert W. Day, Paul R. Milgrom. International Journal of Game Theory, 2008

314 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a633816bdd20d3d0c9fe512939618b97c4570bf1

Citations in the corpus

• School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation. NBER Working Paper No. 16783. (2011, unknown): “Other papers that relate to our methodological contribution include Parkes et al. (2001); Day and Milgrom (2008); and Erdil and Klemperer (2011) who each seek to design a combinatorial auction that minimizes manipulability, and to a lesser extent Kesten (2006) and Dasgupta and Maskin (2008) who…”
• Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts (2012, unknown): “30Milgrom (2007) and Day and Milgrom (2008) discuss some of the issues that arise with complementary preferences in package auctions.”