Matching with Contracts
By John William Hatfield, Paul R. Milgrom. 2005
912 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1a1527736bf38a3b45369f241af7daeedb8dc5d6
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Tayfun Sönmez
- Alexander Westkamp
- Fuhito Kojima
- T. Switzer
- Eric Budish
- John William Hatfield
- Yuichiro Kamada
- Scott Duke Kominers
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Tayfun Sönmez
- Fuhito Kojima
- Alexander Westkamp
- T. Switzer
- Yuichiro Kamada
- Kazuo Murota
- John William Hatfield
- Thayer Morrill
In Marketing
- Tayfun Sönmez
- Alexander Westkamp
- Fuhito Kojima
- Bettina Klaus
- Markus Walzl
- Paul Klemperer
- Lars Ehlers
- Kazuo Murota
Citations in the corpus
- Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts (2006, positive): “The notion of individual rationality we use here is the same as in Echenique and Oviedo (2006) or Hatfield and Milgrom (2005).”
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds (2011, methodology): “Later it was used in matching with contracts by Hatfield and Milgrom [35].”
- Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy (2013, methodology): “If elements of X are substitutes, then the set of stable allocations is nonempty (Hatfield and Milgrom (2005)).14,15 The following example shows that contracts are not necessarily substitutes under the USMA priorities.”
- Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications (2013, background): “Hoffman and Kruskal (1956) show that the vertices of (2.”
- Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism: Strategy-proofness as Equal Access (2006, neutral): “These two schools are outliers relative to the other schools in their respective zones where the distribution of students ranking schools across choices is much smoother.(16)”
- How to Control Controlled School Choice (2015, neutral): “It is also in a sense necessary for these properties to hold (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005).”
- Matching with Contracts: Comment (2013, methodology): “In that sense, letting hospital choice functions to be primitives of the model and assuming IRC throughout the analysis might be the preferred approach to correctly interpret the results of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005).”
- Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation (2010, background): “The gross-substitutes and absence-of-peereffects assumptions have been developed by Gale and Shapley (1962), Kelso and Crawford (1982), Roth (1985), and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), among others.”
- (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice (2017, methodology): “LAD was introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) in a more general model of matching with contracts.”
- Why do intermediaries divert search (2009, neutral): “(e 1 + e 2) ¡¢+μe 1 + 1 2 e 2¶ ∙ μ + 2 2 − 1 ¶ − ¡¢ ̧ +(e 1 + (1− ) e 2 +) ∙ ( ())− μ + 2 2 − 1 ¶ ̧ (14)”