The economic nature of the firm: Bargaining costs, influence costs, and the organization of economic activity

By Paul R. Milgrom, John E. Roberts. 2009

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Coordinating and competing in ecosystems: How organizational forms shape new technology investments (2013, background): “Mgmt. J., 34: 274–296 (2013) DOI: 10.1002/smj these arguments, Milgrom and Roberts (1988; 1990) develop a formal theory of how authority in a hierarchy results in politicking, where parties lobby to influence decision makers for their own personal benefit.”
Opportunity Discovery, Problem Solving and the Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm (2007, background): “While markets are most ideal for discovering solutions to low-interaction problems, many have pointed out that authority can sometimes provide advantages over markets (e.g. Arrow, 1974, pp. 68–70; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, p. 72; Simon, 1951, p. 294; Williamson, 1985).”
Envy, Comparison Costs, and the Economic Theory of the Firm (2008, unknown): “Influence activities within organizations, as discussed by Milgrom and Roberts (1988; 1990a; 1990b), provide a partial explanation.”