The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold‐up and Risk Sharing)

By Ilya Segal, M. Whinston. 2002

132 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/04c71f0bb00b667bcd36aa771a23c030e190178e

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

In Finance

In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Renegotiation of Concession Contracts: A Theoretical Approach (2006, background): “It therefore appears that to have actual renegotiations along the equilibrium path, some degree of contractual incompleteness is needed (Hart and Moore, 1988; Green and Laffont, 1992; Aghion Dewatripont and Rey 1994; Segal and Whinston, 2002 ).”
Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets (2002, background): “15 Segal and Whinston (2002) consider two agents, who choose investments and then participate in a mechanism.”
Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government-led renegotiation (2007, background): “…many others, Dewatripont (1986), Hart and Tirole (1988) and Laffont and Tirole (1990) in the context of complete contracts, and Hart and Moore (1988), Green and Laffont (1992), Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994) and Segal and Whinston (2002) when initial contracts are assumed to be incomplete.”
Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America: Evidence from the water and transport sectors (2008, unknown): “One way is to postulate that initial contracts are incomplete (Hart and Moore (1988), Green and Laffont (1992), Aghion et alii (1994), Segal and Whinston (2002)).”
Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America (2003, unknown): “Concerning the stock and quality levels of infrastructure as of 2000 in Latin American and Caribbean countries, Calderon and Serven (2002) show that while it has improved somehow since 1980, it is still deficient and has lost significant ground relative to East Asia and OECD countries.”
Climate Contracts: A Game of Emissions, Investments, Negotiations, and Renegotiations (2012, background): “…contracting on time is quite similar to contracting on quantity: to increase investments, Guriev and Kvasov let the contract length increase, while Segal and Whinston (2002) let the con- 9In general, however, Chiappori et al. show that the optimal long-term contract is not implementable by spot…”
Cognition and Incomplete Contracts (2009, background): “26 As in Maskin and Moore (1999) and Segal and Whinston (2002), we rule out third parties (“budget breakers”).”