Combinatorial Auctions
By Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard S. Steinberg. 2005
662 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bb52299e1d53fa3b22b37d6a6bdeff07d674c933
Citations in the corpus
- Integer and Combinatorial Optimization (2013, neutral): “Alternatively, an example of a set packing problem is a combinatorial auction (Cramton et al., 2006).”
- Efficiency Resource Allocation for Device-to-Device Underlay Communication Systems: A Reverse Iterative Combinatorial Auction Based Approach (2012, neutral): “ion theory is the private value model, introduced by Vickrey (1961), in which one bidder has a value for each package of items and the value is not related to the private information of other bidders [23]. Much of work has not recognized that bidders care in complex ways about the items they compete”
- Data Collection and Wireless Communication in Internet of Things (IoT) Using Economic Analysis and Pricing Models: A Survey (2016, neutral): “rs, multiple buyers, and an auctioneer Both buyers and sellers submit their bids and asks, respectively Economics: ordinary markets Technical: resource allocation Market equilibrium Combinatorial [82] A seller, multiple buyers, and an auctioneer Multiple heterogeneous auction items, and certain bu”
- Combinatorial Auction-Based Allocation of Virtual Machine Instances in Clouds (2010, neutral): “In combinatorial auctions, the participants bid for bundles of items rather than individual items [10].”
- Auction optimization using regression trees and linear models as integer programs (2014, neutral): “ent’s true preferences, this problem is NP-hard since the resource ordering can be used to simulate the allocation of goods to agents in a combinatorial auction, which is well-known to be NP-complete [6]. We now prove it remains hard2 when the agents only have budget constraints: Theorem 1 Given a s”
- A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice (2007, neutral): “Combinatorial auctions have received a lot of attention in recent years [35]; they are a very specific, purely utilitarian class of allocation procedures, in which considerations such as equity and fairness are not relevant.”