Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions

By Peter Cramton, Jesse A. Schwartz. 2000

309 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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A laboratory study of auctions for reducing non-point source pollution (2003, unknown): “Cramton and Schwartz [8] showed how bidders used the last three digits of multi-million dollar bids to signal the telephone codes of the areas they wished to purchase.”
Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions (2001, unknown): “Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1999) and Brusco and Lopomo (1999) show that for an auction format like the FCC's, where the bidding occurs in rounds and bidding can be done on distinct units, that there exist equilibria where bidders coordinate a division of the available units at low prices…”
Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities (2002, unknown): “E-mail: glopomo@duke.edu”
A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions (2005, background): “There is some reason to believe that this may lead to attempts to strategize in a non-productive way (See Cramton and Schwartz (1998)).”
The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3g Telecom Licences (2001, unknown): “…blocks, with bidders allowed to win multiple blocks, bidders might try to collude to divide the blocks between them; roughly this seems to have happened in some of the U.S. auctions (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 1998; Brusco and Lopomo, 1999; Cramton and Schwartz, 1999, 2000; Klemperer, 2002b).”