Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions
By Peter Cramton, Jesse A. Schwartz. 2001
154 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/80e5bb028116ac09531b2f3e403812ea0fca823f
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In Management Science and Operations Research
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Citations in the corpus
- The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3g Telecom Licences (2001, unknown): “…blocks, with bidders allowed to win multiple blocks, bidders might try to collude to divide the blocks between them; roughly this seems to have happened in some of the U.S. auctions (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 1998; Brusco and Lopomo, 1999; Cramton and Schwartz, 1999, 2000; Klemperer, 2002b).”
- Simultaneous Ascending Auctions (2004, background): “Cramton and Schwartz (2002) found that bidders who commonly use these strategies paid less for the spectrum they ultimately won.”
- Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions (2000, unknown): “The FCC determined minimum opening bids for each license based on population coverage (a bidder who bids on a license that no bidder had bid on in prior rounds can only bid the minimum opening bid).”