Multi-Dimensional Procurement Auctions for Power Reserves: Robust Incentive-Compatible Scoring and Settlement Rules

By Hung-Po Chao, Robert B. Wilson. 2002

137 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Information Systems, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2ea491041e7f86ae116f6f3ef89a9f466ab389b7

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Information Systems

1. Axel Ockenfels
2. Peter Cramton
3. M. Peek
4. Felix Müsgens

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Axel Ockenfels
2. Peter Cramton
3. Steven Stoft
4. Benjamin F. Hobbs
5. M. Peek
6. Felix Müsgens
7. Beibei Wang
8. Alvin E. Roth

In Marketing

1. Axel Ockenfels
2. Peter Cramton
3. M. Peek
4. Felix Müsgens
5. Alvin E. Roth

Citations in the corpus

• Real-Time Markets for Flexiramp: A Stochastic Unit Commitment-Based Analysis (2016, background): “Reference [30] proposed designs for ancillary markets to correctly consider those costs.”
• A review of electricity product differentiation (2014, background): “Each bid is required to specify the amount of load that can be curtailed, along with the per kW upfront payment and the per kW h usage price for each of the curtailable kW [193].”
• Economics and design of balancing power markets in Germany (2014, methodology): “So, we recommend all readers to use our illustration only complementary to Chao and Wilson [3] work and our treatment above.”
• Capacity Market Fundamentals (2013, background): “…in reserve power markets reflect short-or medium-term opportunity costs for withholding capacity from the spot market, plus short-or medium-term (quasi-) fixed costs, minus expected profits from actually being called to deliver reserve energy (e.g., Chao and Wilson 2002, Ockenfels et al. 2011).”
• Economics and Design of Capacity Markets for the Power Sector (2012, background): “…reserve power markets reflect short- or medium-term opportunity costs for withholding capacity from the spot market, plus short- or medium-term (quasi-) fixed costs, minus expected profits from actually being called to deliver reserve energy (e.g., Chao and Wilson 2002; Ockenfels et al. 2011).”
• Managing electricity procurement cost and risk by a local distribution company (2004, background): “Also, the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) conducts daily auctions to procure capacity reserve and real time energy required by safe and reliable grid operation (Chao and Wilson, 2002).”
• Properties of Scoring Auctions (2008, unknown): “This creates incentive problems we ignore (see Athey and Levin, 2001; Chao and Wilson, 2002; Ewerhart and Fieseler, 2003).”