The Convergence of Market Designs for Adequate Generating Capacity

By Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft. 2006

258 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3fd2936bb771ddd6d0481a90b79e4ca708558c82

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Citations in the corpus

A survey on electricity market design: Insights from theory and real-world implementations of capacity remuneration mechanisms (2019, background): “Moreover, de Vries and Hakvoort (2004) argue that even long-term contracts do not provide a solution as they offer consumers the opportunity to free-ride.5 In addition, Keppler (2017) shows two other independent problems of an EOM.”
On the economics of renewable energy sources (2013, background): “In accordance with the diversity of belief or distrust in energy-only market mechanisms found in the literature, the suggested approaches range from “doingnothing/market-solves-the-problem” (Müsgens and Peek, 2011; Nicolosi, 2012b), to “remedy-flawedintervention/energy-only” (Hogan 2005) to “capacit”
Design of an economically efficient feed-in tariff structure for renewable energy development (2008, background): “Crampton and Stoft (2006) discuss the specific design of the FCM auction.”
Capacity Market Fundamentals (2013, background): “…design, it is less fundamental than the considerations this paper addresses, so we will not discuss its design or role further (but see Cramton and Stoft 2006 and Cramton and Ockenfels 2012). c. Missing money and the size of the capacity payment The reliability option approach also…”
Economics and Design of Capacity Markets for the Power Sector (2012, methodology): “…challenge, most power systems established short-term spot 1This and the other sections build on—and are partly taken from— earlier work, including Cramton and Stoft (2005, 2006, 2008), Joskow (2007), Stoft (2002), Ockenfels (2007a, 2008b), as well as on practical experiences in designing…”
Electricity and long-term capacity adequacy: The quest for regulatory mechanism compatible with electricity market (2008, methodology): “These principles are captured in the two proposals: the forward contracts mechanism proposed by Cramton and Stoft (2005; 2006), to be implemented on the New England market, and the centralised markets for reliability options contracs proposed (in particular) by Vasquez, Rivier and Perez-Arriaga…”
Competitive Electricity Markets and Investment in New Generating Capacity (2006, background): “See Table 7.”
Lessons Learned From Electricity Market Liberalization (2008, background): “…in the U.S. make it fairly clear that “energy-only” markets do not produce adequate revenues to attract investment in generating capacity consistent with the reliability standards that are still applicable to them and have now become mandatory (Joskow 2006a and 2007, Cramton and Stoft 2006).”