A capacity market that makes sense

By Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft. IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting, 2005

310 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/964304cc47cb0d1f9e0b73ceb65e16fcd9ab728c

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Citations in the corpus

A review of electricity product differentiation (2014, background): “power pool, to procure the capacity that will ensure resource adequacy [77–79].”
Market-Based Coordination of Transmission and Generation Capacity Planning (2007, background): “Typically, building a new transmission facility, including licensing, may take an extended period of 5–10 years [23].”
Electricity and long-term capacity adequacy: The quest for regulatory mechanism compatible with electricity market (2008, background): “These principles are captured in the two proposals: the forward contracts mechanism proposed by Cramton and Stoft (2005; 2006), to be implemented on the New England market, and the centralised markets for reliability options contracs proposed (in particular) by Vasquez, Rivier and Perez-Arriaga…”
Economics and Design of Capacity Markets for the Power Sector (2012, background): “…challenge, most power systems established short-term spot 1This and the other sections build on—and are partly taken from— earlier work, including Cramton and Stoft (2005, 2006, 2008), Joskow (2007), Stoft (2002), Ockenfels (2007a, 2008b), as well as on practical experiences in designing…”
Markets for Power in the United States: An Interim Assessment (2006, unknown): “Efforts are being made to reform capacity obligations and associated market mechanisms to try to deal with them (Cramton and Stoft (2005)).”
Generation Adequacy via Call Options Obligations: Safe Passage to the Promised Land (2005, methodology): “Thus, the downwardsloping effect provided in NYISO and the NEISO LICAP proposal via an artificial ''demand curve'' for capacity is provided in our scheme through the profit opportunity given to generators who do not sell options and instead take their chances on inframarginal profits from selling en”
A Dynamic Analysis of a Demand Curve-Based Capacity Market Proposal: The PJM Reliability Pricing Model (2007, background): “This gives a sample size of 2500 years, allowing calculation of the long-run average and standard deviation of each performance index.”
A survey on electricity market design: Insights from theory and real-world implementations of capacity remuneration mechanisms (2019, background): “, households have a fixed rate for energy consumption in combination with a base rate tariff (Dütschke and Paetz, 2013) and, thus, do not actively participate in the volatile wholesale market or show any reaction even to drastic prices changes (Cramton and Stoft, 2005).”