Yeon-Koo Che

Economics and Econometrics · 2001–2018

A researcher in the Science corpus: 10 papers; trusts 25 researchers and is trusted by 12 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

• Economics and Econometrics — 59 citations into it; #12,370 of 23,481 by trust here, #7,944 by citations
• Management Science and Operations Research — 57 citations into it; #3,327 of 11,946 by trust here, #1,155 by citations
• Safety Research — 22 citations into it; #2,107 of 5,829 by trust here, #1,624 by citations
• Education — 14 citations into it; #10,822 of 11,309 by trust here, #7,537 by citations
• Sociology and Political Science — 10 citations into it
• Political Science and International Relations — 5 citations into it

Whom Yeon-Koo Che trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

1. Anna Bogomolnaia
2. Christopher A. Sims
3. Fuhito Kojima
4. Matthew Gentzkow
5. Atila Abdulkadiroglu
6. Gregory J Martin
7. Goran Peskir
8. Filip Matejka
9. Parag A. Pathak
10. Wing Suen

Who trusts Yeon-Koo Che overall

1. Eric Budish
2. Ron Siegel
3. Fuhito Kojima
4. Roman M. Sheremeta
5. Benny Moldovanu
6. Olivier Compte
7. Atila Abdulkadiroglu
8. Jonathan D. Levin
9. M. Utku Ünver
10. David Martimort

Papers from Yeon-Koo Che's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers Yeon-Koo Che trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

1. A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem (Journal of Economics Theory)
2. STRATEGIC INFORMATION TRANSMISSION
3. What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice
4. Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism
5. School Choice with Consent
6. Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
7. The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting
8. The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (Journal of Political Economy)
9. Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism
10. Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice

Their papers

• Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications (2013) — 389 citations
• Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice (2015) — 195 citations
• Optimal Design of Research Contests (2003) — 454 citations
• Competitive Procurement with Corruption (2004) — 257 citations
• Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms (2008) — 213 citations
• Opinions as Incentives (2009) — 243 citations
• Optimal Incentives for Teams (2001) — 601 citations
• Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Attention (2018) — 102 citations
• Pandering to Persuade (2013) — 137 citations
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation (2006) — 166 citations