Optimal Design of Research Contests

By Yeon-Koo Che, I. Gale. 2003

454 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4c4c26890c58d7a7141ebb92c47a604f059588cd

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Citations in the corpus

Auctions and Information acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats? (2007, background): “follows that when condition ( 5 ) is met acquiring information yields a negative expected payoff”
Contests for Experimentation (2017, background): “If an agent works in a period and the state is good, the agent succeeds in that period with probability l ∈ (0, 1); if either the agent shirks or the state is bad, the agent does not succeed.4 Working in a period costs an agent c > 0.”
Entry into Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests: An Experimental Study (2010, background): “…the entry choice for these cases is modeled as a logit function of gender and a time trend, for the subset of cases where the PP contest has a higher expected profit. experimental studies such as Moldovanu and Sela (2001, 2006), Che and Gale (2003), Müller and Schotter (2009), and Sheremeta (2010).”
Incentives and Problem Uncertainty in Innovation Contests: An Empirical Analysis (2011, background): “Most economic models of tournaments suggest that widespread entry should diminish contest performance by reducing incentives to exert effort for all competitors (Che and Gale 2003, Fullerton and McAfee 1999, Taylor 1995).”
Innovation Contests, Open Innovation, and Multiagent Problem Solving (2008, background): “…on R&D tournaments (Taylor 1995, Fullerton and McAfee 1999, Che and Gale 2003) suggests that a free-entry R&D tournament is in general not optimal, and it is necessary to restrict the size of a R&D tournament, potentially all the way down to two (Fullerton and McAfee 1999, Che and Gale 2003).”
Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation (2009, unknown): “For more multiple prize contests see Glazer and Hassin (1988), Barut and Kovenock (1998), and Che and Gale (2003) .”
Crowdsourcing City Government: Using Tournaments to Improve Inspection Accuracy † (2016, background): “Such tour-naments are sometimes modeled as all-pay auctions, but the prior work has focused on questions of optimal mechanism/prize design, rather than on the types of problems best solved via contests (see, e.g., Che and Gale (2003); Siegel (2009)).”
Contest architecture (2006, background): “Che and Gale show that a first-price auction among two firms is the optimal contest design in this framework.”
Procurement When Price and Quality Matter (2010, background): “…2004), the impact of the potential non-contractability of quality (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Taylor, 1993; Manelli and Vincent, 1995; Morand and Thomas, 2002; Che and Gale, 2003), and the impact of moral hazard and renegotiation (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001, Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis, 2004).”
Marginality and Problem-Solving Effectiveness in Broadcast Search (2010, background): “While the extant economics literature on research tournaments (see for example: Che and Gale 2003; Fulllerton and McAfee 1999) has primarily focused on tournament design, incentives to participate, award size, entry criteria and the optimal size of the solver pool, there has been no examination of…”
Asymmetric Contests with Conditional Investments (2010, background): “Equation (9) characterizes si implicitly, and provides a simple closed-form expression for si when α = 1 (see Section 4.”