Fuhito Kojima

Economics and Econometrics · 2008–2015

A researcher in the Science corpus: 8 papers; trusts 27 researchers and is trusted by 11 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

• Economics and Econometrics — 119 citations into it; #6,857 of 23,481 by trust here, #6,370 by citations
• Management Science and Operations Research — 92 citations into it; #3,554 of 11,946 by trust here, #2,402 by citations
• Education — 41 citations into it
• Marketing — 19 citations into it
• Safety Research — 14 citations into it; #3,670 of 5,829 by trust here, #5,012 by citations
• Gender Studies — 11 citations into it
• Political Science and International Relations — 9 citations into it
• Algorithms & Complexity — 5 citations into it

Whom Fuhito Kojima trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

1. Tayfun Sönmez
2. Atila Abdulkadiroglu
3. Haluk Ergin
4. John William Hatfield
5. Parag A. Pathak
6. Alvin E. Roth
7. Paul R. Milgrom
8. Aytek Erdil
9. Anna Bogomolnaia
10. Onur Kesten

Who trusts Fuhito Kojima overall

1. Thayer Morrill
2. Yeon-Koo Che
3. Lars Ehlers
4. Atila Abdulkadiroglu
5. Parag A. Pathak
6. Yuichiro Kamada
7. Tayfun Sönmez
8. Onur Kesten
9. M. Utku Ünver
10. Eric Budish

Papers from Fuhito Kojima's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers Fuhito Kojima trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

1. A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem (Journal of Economics Theory)
2. College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
3. Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism
4. COURSE BIDDING AT BUSINESS SCHOOLS
5. Putting Auction Theory to Work
6. What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice
7. Matching with Contracts
8. Equilibria and Indivisibilities: Gross Substitutes and Complements
9. School Choice with Consent
10. Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications

Their papers

• Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications (2013) — 389 citations
• Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms (2008) — 213 citations
• Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets* (2013) — 220 citations
• Appendix to "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets" (2009) — 199 citations
• Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications (2015) — 256 citations
• AXIOMS FOR DEFERRED ACCEPTANCE (2010) — 140 citations
• Designing Matching Mechanisms under General Distributional Constraints (2015) — 66 citations
• The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (2014) — 107 citations