Optimal Incentives for Teams

By Yeon-Koo Che, Seung-Weon Yoo. 2001

601 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f1fcb460524a124478415fb5cee2c32410f780e0

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. David Martimort
2. Elisabetta Iossa

In Safety Research

1. Steffen Huck
2. David Martimort

Citations in the corpus

• Implications of Power: When the CEO Can Pressure the CFO to Bias Reports (2014, unknown): “Related papers focus on incentives in multi-period games that are useful for sustaining implicit side contracts between agents (e.g., Arya et al., 1997; Che and Yoo, 2001).”
• Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms (2012, background): “19A related argument in favor of team work is provided by Che and Yoo (2001).”
• Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman (2015) …nd a signi…cant positive relationship between total pay and percentage volatility for …nancial …rms.”
• To build or not to build: Normative and positive theories of public-private partnerships (2008, background): “More generally, the impact of production externalities on the kind of incentive schemes used in multiagent contexts (most notably relative performance evaluations versus joint performance evaluations), keeping this separation between agents as given, has also been investigated in Choi (1993) and Che”