Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism

By Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez. 2008

409 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d811d2011f9d90077056444a35f0e54077b49e9f

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Citations in the corpus

Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets* (2013, neutral): “…that the size of the stable set is small: see, for example, Roth and Peranson (1999), table 9, which examines the market for thoracic surgeons, and Pathak and Sönmez (2008), p. 1645, on Boston school choice. by guest on Septem ber 7, 2013 http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from T A B…”
School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation. NBER Working Paper No. 16783. (2011, neutral): “Clearly if mechanism ψ is strongly more manipulable than mechanism φ, then mechanism ψ is also more manipulable than mechanism φ. B. Two-Sided Matching Markets Our next application pertains to college admissions model of Gale and Shapley (1962).”
Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice (2015, background): “For large markets, this mechanism admits a competitive equilibrium, which is ex ante efficient by the first welfare theorem.(34) Our result has a similar flavor.”
Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy (2013, background): “(See Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003), Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, Roth, and Sönmez (2005), Kesten (2010), Pathak and Sönmez (2008, 2011).)”
Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston’s Walk Zones (2018, methodology): “, truthfulness) of the assignment mechanism used in Boston justifies re-computing the assignment without modeling how applicants might submit preferences under counterfactual mechanisms (see Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, Roth, and Sönmez (2006), Pathak and Sönmez (2008), Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, and Roth (”
A theory of school‐choice lotteries (2015, methodology): “Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) pointed out that the Boston mechanism is flawed in many ways (also see Chen and Sönmez, 2006; Ergin and Sönmez, 2006; Pais and Pinter, 2007; Pathak and Sönmez, 2008).”
Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms (2017, positive): “” (2)For instance, school choice mechanisms that lack dominant strategies may harm parents who do not strategize well (Pathak and Sönmez, 2008).”
Heterogeneous Preferences and the Efficacy of Public School Choice (2008, background): “We discuss this evidence in more Even in long-standing limited choice plans where districts instruct parents to choose strategically, there is evidence that many parents do not act strategically (Pathak and Sönmez (2008)).”
The Demand for Effective Charter Schools (2018, neutral): “This system of independent enrollment processes is in contrast to the centralized enrollment mechanism used for Boston’s traditional public schools, which collects lists of students’ preferences over schools and generates a single offer for each student (Pathak and Sönmez 2008).”
An analysis of the German university admissions system (2013, background): “Pathak and Sönmez (2008) show that when some students are naive in the sense that they always submit preferences truthfully, equilibrium outcomes of the Boston mechanism coincide with the set of matchings that are stable for a modified economy in which naive students lose their priorities to…”
Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications (2015, background): “equal access for children and parents with different degrees of sophistication to strategize (Pathak and Sonmez, 2008).”