School Choice with Consent

By Onur Kesten. 2010

314 citations recorded by the source corpus.

An increasingly popular practice for student assignment to public schools in the United States is the use of school choice systems. The celebrated Gale. Shapley student-optimal stable mechanism (SOSM) has recently replaced two deficient student assignment mechanisms that were in use in New York City and Boston. We provide theoretical evidence that the SOSM outcome may produce large welfare losses. Then we propose an efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (EADAM) that allows a student to consent to waive a certain priority that has no effect on his or her assignment. Under EADAM, consenting students cause themselves no harm, but may help many others benefit as a consequence. We show that EADAM can recover any welfare losses due to SOSM while also preserving immunity against strategic behavior in a particular way. It is also possible to use EADAM to eliminate welfare losses due to randomly breaking ties in student priorities.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Education, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6b331a25836884c6c88e377ad9dbe8048a951f97

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Citations in the corpus

Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy (2013, background): “(See Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003), Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, Roth, and Sönmez (2005), Kesten (2010), Pathak and Sönmez (2008, 2011).)”
A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets (2016, unknown): “First, although we are interested in matching markets more generally, our contribution is directly motivated by the literature on the design of large matching clearinghouses, such as the school matches in Boston and New York City (Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2005a,b; Sönmez and Unver 2009; Kesten 2010; Ke”
An alternative characterization of top trading cycles (2013, background): “…a characterization of DA in terms of non-wastefulness,3 weak Maskin monotonicity, and population monotonicity.4 Indeed, the advantage of our characterization is we may make a direct 2This is the motivation for the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm introduced in Kesten (2010).”
The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match (2017, background): “Deferred acceptance cannot be Pareto-improved upon without sacrificing strategy-proofness for students (Erdil and Ergin 2008, Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, and Roth 2009, Kesten 2010, Kesten and Kurino 2012).”
Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications (2015, background): “Milgrom (2009) and Budish, Che, Kojima, and Milgrom (2013) consider object allocation mechanisms with restrictions similar to the regional caps in our model.”
Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice (2015, background): “Another mechanism that incorporates cardinal welfare is the pseudo-market mechanism proposed by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979).(27) This mechanism purports to install competitive markets for trading probability shares of alternative objects using a fictitious currency.”
Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources (2009, unknown): “…property of the Gale-Shapley mechanism relates its effi ciency properties to any other strategy-proof and Pareto-effi cient mechanism: Theorem 32 (Kesten 2010) When priorities are strict, the Gale-Shapley student-optimal stable mechanism is not Pareto-dominated by any other Pareto-effi cient…”
(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice (2017, methodology): “As a byproduct, we offer a foundation for the generalization of Kesten’s efficiency adjusted DA-mechanism to school choice environments where priorities are given by substitutable choice functions. Our paper is most closely related to Morrill (2017) which reinterprets fair school assignments. Typica”
School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds (2011, methodology): “In Appendix A, we provide a simpler and more intuitive algorithm for ﬁnding such an assignment that we call the deferred acceptance algorithm with ﬁxed type allotments ( DAAFTA ) We also show how DAAFTA followed by SEA works in Appendix A”