STRATEGIC INFORMATION TRANSMISSION

By Vincent P. Crawford, Joel Sobel. 1982

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Citations in the corpus

Price of Transparency in Strategic Machine Learning (2016, methodology): “There exists a substantial amount of literature in information economics on communicating information in senser-receiver games: using as advertising [12], [13], education [14], disclosure of verifiable information [15], or cheap talk [16], or information disclosure[17], [18].”
Multi-Agent Cooperation and the Emergence of (Natural) Language (2016, methodology): “These games have been used as models to study the evolution of language both theoretically and experimentally (Crawford, 1998; Blume et al., 1998; Crawford & Sobel, 1982).”
The Hanabi Challenge: A New Frontier for AI Research (2019, background): “(historically called a pooling equilibrium in pure signalling games [15], or a babbling equilibrium in later work using cheap talk [16]).”
Emergent Communication through Negotiation (2018, background): “However, when communicating via cheap talk (Crawford & Sobel, 1982; Farrell & Rabin, 1996), a task-independent communication channel consisting of sequences of arbitrary symbols similar to language, selﬁsh agents fail to exhibit negotiating behaviour at all.”
Disclosing Multiple Product Attributes (2011, unknown): “See Crawford and Sobel (1982)’s seminal paper on cheap talk: disclosure of payoff- relevant information in a sender–receiver framework. than sending a message and the receiver’s best response is increasing in the sender’s true type.”
Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first? ☆ (2001, background): “Information can also be transmitted through costless signaling, as in Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) model of cheap-talk communication.”
Control of Corporate Decisions: Shareholders vs. Management (2010, methodology): “Our model is similar to those in Crawford and Sobel (1982, hereafter CS), Dessein (2002), and Harris and Raviv (2005, 2008a).”
The Self‐Perpetuation of Biased Beliefs (2004, unknown): “It is also possible to give a game-theoretic explanation for information coarsening based on a model of strategic information transmission (Crawford and Sobel, 1982).”
THE S UPPLY O F I NFORMATION BY A C ONCERNED EXPERT (2004, background): “How much information should a policy maker pass on to an ill-informed citizen? In this paper, we address this classic question of Crawford and Sobel (1982) in a setting in which beliefs impact utility, as in Kreps and Porteus (1978). We show that this question cannot be answered using a utility func”
Credulity, lies, and costly talk (2007, unknown): “Building on Crawford and Sobel's [9] (hereafter, CS) " cheap talk " model, this paper formulates a model that encompasses situations in which investors naively believe in the analyst's recommendation .”
Arms Races and Negotiations (2004, background): “A large literature on sender-receiver games followed Crawford and Sobel [8].”
The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure (2003, methodology): “A more general model of sender-receiver games was introduced and analyzed by Crawford and Sobel (1982).”
Aspirations, Poverty and Economic Change (2002, background): “11Such an argument would be a simple variant of Crawford and Sobel (1982).”
Accounting Disclosure and Real Effects (2007, background): “Such a deliberate attempt to communicate would be more in the spirit of cheap talk games, as in Crawford and Sobel (1982).”