Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice

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An analysis of the German university admissions system (2013, background): “(2) Among applicants in B(2), temporarily accept the q(u,2)(r1) = 3 5 qu + r1 highest ranking acceptable applicants with respect to (u,2).”
Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications (2013, methodology): “37 Budish (2011) proposes a multi-unit assignment mechanism that accommodates arbitrary ordinal preferences over schedules, but which is only approximately ex post efficient. It too is based on the idea of CEEI, but uses the framework to find an ex post sure assignment; by contrast, we use CEEI to f”
Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions (2019, background): “Although this process might not complete in finite time, it converges in the limit (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2015).”
A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets (2016, unknown): “Abdulkadiroğlu, Che, and Yasuda (2015) use a cutoff characterization in a particular case of our model.”
A theory of school‐choice lotteries (2015, background): “We say that a random matching ρ ∈ X causes ex-ante school-wise justified envy of i ∈ I toward (lower-priority student) j ∈ I\ {i} , with i ≻c j, for c ∈ C if ρi,a > 0 for some a ≺i c and ρj,c > 0.”