Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism

By Haluk Ergin, Tayfun Sönmez. 2006

374 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Education, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ebed947a52873f32fed1e35f0b7615bf7885acba

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Citations in the corpus

An analysis of the German university admissions system (2013, methodology): “While this result is related to the equilibrium characterizations for the Boston mechanism by Ergin and Sönmez (2006) and for the revelation game induced by the CDA by Sotomayor (2007), its proof is significantly more difficult due to the sequential nature of the German admissions procedure and…”
Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism: Strategy-proofness as Equal Access (2006, neutral): “…preference revelation game induced by the Boston mechanism is weakly Pareto dominated by each dominant-strategy equilibrium outcome of the studentproposing deferred acceptance mechanism (Ergin and Sönmez 2006), equilibrium outcomes induced by the Boston mechanism and TTC are not Pareto ranked.”
Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical Analysis (2017, background): “• The round terminates whenever each student is either assigned to a school or is unassigned in this round, that is, he has been rejected by all his first e choice schools.”
Bidding for Army Career Specialties: Improving the ROTC Branching Mechanism (2013, background): “More recent applications include student admissions ðBalinski and Sönmez 1999; Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez 2003; Ergin and Sönmez 2006; Ergin and Erdil 2008; Pathak and Sönmez 2008; Kesten 2010Þ, kidney exchange ðRoth, Sönmez, and Ünver 2004, 2005, 2007; Ünver 2010Þ, course allocation…”
School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation. NBER Working Paper No. 16783. (2011, positive): “…been central during policy deliberations at Boston Public Schools, experimental evidence from Chen and Sönmez (2006) and theoretical results from Ergin and Sönmez (2006) show that the student-optimal stable mechanism is more efficient than the Boston mechanism in complete information…”
Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources (2009, neutral): “The following theorem is about the Nash equilibria of the Boston Mechanism revelation game: Theorem 30 (Ergin and Sönmez 2006) When priorities are strict, the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the preference revelation game induced by the Boston mechanism is equal to the set of stable matchings…”
Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications (2015, background): “Similarly, some schools (or school districts) desire certain diversity characteristics of their incoming classes such as ethnicity and academic performance (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003; Abdulkadiroğlu, 2005; Ergin and Sönmez, 2006).”
Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions (2019, background): “Citing the results in Haeringer and Klijn (2009), Appendix A.2.5 further shows that every Nash equilibrium outcome in the continuum economy is stable if and only if student priority indices at all schools satisfy the so-called Ergin acyclicity condition.”
Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design (2019, background): “This DA class includes student-proposing DA, serial dictatorship, the immediate acceptance (Boston) mechanism (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003),Ergin and Sönmez (2006)), China’s parallel mechanisms (Chen and Kesten, 2017), England’s first-preference-first mechanisms (Pathak and Sönmez, 2013),…”
Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice (2015, background): “Another mechanism that incorporates cardinal welfare is the pseudo-market mechanism proposed by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979).(17) This mechanism purports to install competitive (15)For the example discussed in Introduction, Boston mechanism also implements the desirable assignment.”
Constrained school choice (2009, neutral): “In fact, a straightforward extension of a result due to Ergin and Sönmez (2006) says that the Boston mechanisms implements the set of stable matching, independently of the quota. For the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism existence of Nash equilibria in pure strategies was proved by Romero-Medina (199”
A theory of school‐choice lotteries (2015, background): “Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) pointed out that the Boston mechanism is flawed in many ways (also see Chen and Sönmez, 2006; Ergin and Sönmez, 2006; Pais and Pinter, 2007; Pathak and Sönmez, 2008).”
What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice (2008, background): “On the other hand, in the school choice model, schools See Abdulkadirog˘lu, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth (2005, 2008), Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2005, 2006), Ergin (2002), Ergin and Sönmez (2006), and Onur Kesten (2005, 2006).”