What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice

By Aytek Erdil, Haluk Ergin. 2008

408 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9b1e33654de3aaa32cb15713611541235f76a11d

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Citations in the corpus

Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (2010, neutral): “…somehow overlooked by the theoretical literature until a few years ago, proved to be far more complex and important than originally thought (Erdil and Ergin, 2008).2 In this paper we focus on another seemingly unimportant aspect of school choice mechanisms which turns out to have strong…”
The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence (2015, methodology): “Then, Stable Improvement Cycles are executed as defined in Erdil and Ergin (2008).”
Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston’s Walk Zones (2018, background): “, Erdil and Ergin 2008; Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, and Roth 2009; Pathak and Sethuraman 2011). Yet results on school-side indifferences do not extend to indifferences in student preferences. Finally, our goal here is to establish comparative static results based on Boston’s policy developments. In subs”
A theory of school‐choice lotteries (2015, methodology): “As a result of this observation nonstrategy-proof mechanisms have been highly advocated and proposed in the recent literature on school choice (see e.g. Erdil and Ergin (2008), Kesten (2009a), and Abdulkadiroğlu, Che, and Yasuda (2008)).”
Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences (2013, background): “Erdil and Ergin [193] studied resident-Pareto stable matchings in instances of hrt where resident preference lists are strictly ordered.”
Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice (2015, background): “2%.(21) (21)At the extreme case of α = 1, preferences are the same so every matching is efficient and the welfare generated by each mechanism is equal to the first best welfare.”
Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match (2009, neutral): “It is also possible that a fraction of these students actually preferred exactly 12 schools, and the number of students ranking 11 choices is a rough approximation of this number.”
Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications (2015, background): “Abdulkadiroğlu, Che, and Yasuda (2008, 2009), Erdil and Ergin (2008), and Kesten (2009) analyze alternative mechanisms that may produce more efficient student placements than those that are currently used in New York City and Boston.”
An analysis of the German university admissions system (2013, background): “See Erdil and Ergin (2008), Abdulkadiroglu et al (2009), Ehlers and Erdil (2010), and Ehlers and Westkamp (2011) for analyses of the priority based allocation problem when priorities are not necessarily strict.”
Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources (2009, neutral): “…stable mechanism is strategy-proof and Pareto-dominant among mechanisms that eliminate justified envy when priorities are strict: Theorem 35 (Erdil and Ergin 2008) When priorities are weak, there is no mechanism that is constrained Pareto-effi cient (within the justified-envy-free class)…”
A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets (2016, neutral): “Similarly, the DA-STB mechanism is ex-Post inefficient, having a positive probability of its outcome being Pareto dominated by other stable matchings (Erdil and Ergin 2008).”
The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match (2017, background): “…seats at more preferred schools once others decline; and 3) the old mechanism invited strategic considerations on student ranking, as schools were able to see the entire rank ordering of applicants in the old mechanism and some advertised they would only consider those who ranked them first.”