Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
By Yeon-Koo Che, Fuhito Kojima. 2008
213 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Computational Theory and Mathematics, Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a3769e0de98d18c9315805675b4821d0c90b0a19
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Computational Theory and Mathematics
In Economics and Econometrics
- Eric Budish
- Yeon-Koo Che
- Yosuke Yasuda
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu
- Fuhito Kojima
- M. Utku Ünver
- Tayfun Sönmez
- Parag A. Pathak
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Eric Budish
- Yeon-Koo Che
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu
- Yosuke Yasuda
- Fuhito Kojima
- M. Utku Ünver
- Tayfun Sönmez
- Onur Kesten
Citations in the corpus
- A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets (2016, unknown): “Specifically, we give a simple derivation of results by Che and Kojima (2010) for the canonical random serial dictatorship mechanism, and generalize them with novel results for a state-of-the art mechanism used in real school choice systems.”
- Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice (2015, background): “This is an implication of Che and Kojima (2008), who show that the random priority rule (which coincides with our DASTB) becomes indistinguishable from the probabilistic serial mechanism (which is known to be OE) as the economy grows large.”
- The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (2010, background): “Hence, the properties help us to make sense of the empirical patterns of dictatorship usage.(26)”
- Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets* (2013, unknown): “This market experienced serious problems having to do with the timing of offers and acceptances, and this unraveling of the market led to the creation of a centralized clearinghouse in the 1950s that drew high rates of participation (see Roth 1984, 2003; Roth and Xing 1994 for further details).”
- Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources (2009, unknown): “Katta and Sethuraman (2006) generalized the PS mechanism when indifferences are allowed in 2See Manea (2006) and Che and Kojima (2008) about results on asymptotic ordinal ineffi ciency and effi ciency of RSD in different large economies, respectively.”
- Asymptotic ordinal inefficiency of random serial dictatorship (2009, unknown): “[166, 168, 170] Che, Yeon-Koo and Fuhito Kojima (2008), “Asymptotic equivalence of probabilistic serial and random priority mechanisms.””